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In January 2016, journalist and author Carol Pogash published Quotations from 
Chairman Trump, a compilation of quotes skewering the eponymous business mogul and then-
presidential candidate. If the name itself was a blatant reference to the original Quotations from 
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, then Pogash took a step further in drawing parallels between Trump 
and former Chinese leader Mao Zedong by publishing her book in a similar palm-size format 
with bright red binding.Trump’s lofty countenance is etched on the cover in the style of Socialist 
Realism, one of the most recognizable styles used in mid-century Communist artwork, and is 
wreathed within a stylized sun — once again symbolic of Mao, who himself was revered as the 
“Red Sun” at the height of his power.  Quotes in Chairman Trump include unflattering and 1
provocative sayings lampooning his legitimacy in holding public office, including “I’m, like, a 
really smart person” or “I will absolutely apologize sometime, hopefully in the distant future — 
if I’m ever wrong.”   Pogash’s selection of quotes are undoubtedly to make Trump appear 2
foolish, and the book’s overview emulates the stilted English-language translations of 
Communist literature: “Generations of schoolchildren will memorize these rubies of wisdom 
from President Trump.”  3
 Such an attribution was common in Chinese propaganda of the 50s and 60s. Perhaps the most famous example of 1
the sun as a symbol of Mao’s power and party is the folk tune and unofficial anthem “The East is Red,” which 
begins with the following lyrics: “The East is red, the sun rises/From China comes Mao Zedong.”
 Carol Pogash, Quotations from Chairman Trump (New York: RosettaBooks, 2016). 2
 Quotations from Chairman Trump, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/quotations-from-chairman-trump-carol-3
pogash/1123057602#productInfoTabs, accessed March 23, 2017.
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 Pogash, however, did not necessarily choose to utilize the Quotations because of her 
familiarity with the original material. In fact, according to her interview with on MSNBC’s 
Hardball with Chris Matthews, she revealed that she had “not exactly” studied the work before 
beginning work on Chairman Trump. When asked by Matthews about similarities that she saw 
between Trump and Mao, she replied that both leaders “have a certain grandiosity [about them]” 
and “an authoritarian streak.”  Matthews, in turn, responded that Chairman Trump could be used 4
like a “Gideon Bible,” comparing the book to a holy book, a religious text meant to provide 
some means of spiritual guidance.  Pogash’s comments reveal something surprising about 5
modern American political culture- despite her lack of detailed knowledge about the Quotations, 
she had a preexisting understanding of its usage that she applied onto Trump. This “preexisting 
understanding” can be summarized as the dogmatic “bible” of a despotic leader, meant to be 
carried by the mindless masses.   
 How did Pogash, with her lack of knowledge about Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-
Tung, know of the “Little Red Book”? How can the comparison of Trump, a vehement capitalist, 
to Mao, an anti-establishment Marxist, even make sense? Finding the answer lies in 
understanding what the Quotations are, where they came from, and how Americans during the 
societally fractured global 1960s took it upon themselves to interpret one of the most prolifically 
printed texts in modern history. 
 
 
 See Chapter 1. 4
 “Hardball with Chris Matthews: Quotations from Chairman Trump,” MSNBC Video, 2:14, January 26 2016, http://5
www.msnbc.com/hardball/watch/quotations-from-chairman-trump-611921475985. 
 2
The Origins of the Little Red Book 
The advent of the 1960s marked one of the most tumultuous decades of modern global 
history.s. Externally a call for a “return” to Marxist values and politically a crackdown on the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) political detractors, the Cultural Revolution was set in 
motion by CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966. For much of the next decade, the sociopolitical 
movement seemingly meant to purge China of anti-Marxist “revisionists” helped to consolidate 
Mao’s political power. The ideological fanaticism that emerged from the movement propelled 
Mao to the forefront of the CCP’s leadership and secured him, in both the eyes of Chinese 
citizens and the international community, as the leader of China until his death in 1976. The 
country itself was left behind with political factionalization, mass civil unrest, and the violent 
persecution of millions.  
 The Cultural Revolution’s volatile nature can be strongly attributed to the cult of 
personality that grew around Mao over the course of the 1960s. By triumphing his Sino-centric 
version of Marxism, Mao and his advisors gained mass popular support among the citizenry. 
Consolidating popular support among the Chinese population (over 677 million in 1960)  came 6
in many forms that seeped into numerous aspects of Chinese society. Political slogans promoting 
Mao’s most popular sayings were scrawled onto building walls, printed in state-run newspapers, 
and pasted on cars and aircraft; Chinese film and literature were limited to state-approved 
productions glorifying revolutionary struggle. Even in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, 
visualization of loyalty to Mao was a ubiquitous aspect of Chinese propaganda campaigns.  
 Data from the World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL, accessed December 28th, 2016.6
 3
Instrumental to the creation of the Mao personality cult was Minister of National Defense 
and Vice Premier Lin Biao, a marshal of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and, during the 
early years of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s designated successor.  An army man who had 7
served the CCP since the late 1920s, Lin had had extensive experience with promoting Mao and 
criticizing his opponents. After the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), he 
continued to work extensively with the People’s Liberation Army into the 1960s. One of Lin’s 
primary duties was to manage the army’s newspaper and foremost mouthpiece, the People’s 
Liberation Army Daily, while ensuring political education for army members. To implement that 
political education, Lin combined extensive study of the stories of Communist martyrs with 
short, memorable quotes treated as moral lessons for PLA soldiers to live by, many of the sayings 
pulled (and sometimes carefully revised) from Mao’s former speeches and writings. These quotes 
ranged in topics from Marxism to self-criticism to the role of women, with one appearing in each 
issue of the PLA Daily.  
A PLA Daily deputy editor later suggested merging these quotes into a small booklet 
sorted by topic chapters. The first iteration of this book was known as 200 Quotations from 
Chairman Mao.  Six months of revisions after the booklet’s first appearance in mid-1963, 200 8
Quotations was granted its official title, Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao zhuxi 
yulu). The first edition of the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong (henceforth referred to as 
the Quotations) was released in May 1964 with a run of 4.2 million copies, printed by the army-
run People’s Liberation Army Publishing House. It contained 33 chapters and 267 quotes, sorted 
 The People’s Liberation Army is the name of the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (1949-present). 7
 Daniel Leese, “Origins and Spread of the Little Red Book in China,” in Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History 8
ed. Alexander Cook (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 29. 
 4
by topics including “The Communist Party,” “Relations Between the Army and the People,” and 
“Correcting Mistaken Ideas.” Lin himself contributed a foreword to the first edition, 
supplementing his introduction with handwritten calligraphy drawn from the diary of Chinese 
martyr Lei Feng: “Read Chairman Mao’s books, listen to Chairman Mao’s words, act according 
to Chairman Mao’s instructions.”  An addition to his foreword in the second edition encouraged 9
readers to wield the book as an ideological weapon “for opposing imperialism, revisionism and 
dogmatism,” establishing it as a literary tool that was intended for both spiritual and practical 
usage — food for thought and faith.   10
The small size of the book (roughly that of an average man’s palm) made it easy to fit 
into a soldier’s shirt pocket; the bright red, waterproof vinyl cover and photo portrait of Mao on 
the first page made the purpose of its usage visually obvious. Soldiers, or cadres as they were 
known, were expected to study from the book in their time off, discussing in groups and using 
the relevant quotations in order to better their service to the CCP. The book rapidly became a 
mainstay of soldiers’ standard issue equipment — a 1965 forward for the Quotations issued by 
the General Political Department explained that the army issued the book “to every soldier in the 
whole army, just as we issue weapons.”  A 1966 directive from the PLA General Political 11
Department furthered the connection between cadre and book, urging soldiers to “put themselves 
  Daniel Leese, Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 9
Press, 2011), 112-113. 
 Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Stuart Schram (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), 2. 10
 Ibid, xxxii. 11
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in [to serve the country],” molding their beliefs to further the ideological revolution and “serve 
wholeheartedly” China and the Communist world.   12
Print runs were limited at first, with Chinese publishers printing enough copies for each 
PLA member to receive one. However, the Quotations would soon begin appearing within 
civilian society as well. When Mao announced the “Learn from the PLA” national campaign in 
1964, heralding the beginning of military-style reorganization in Chinese civilian society, the 
Quotations drastically increased in importance.  Ensuing civilian demand for the Quotations 13
was largely an artificial construct created through Mao’s national campaign and simultaneous 
political study sessions that were emulated across the country, particularly in rural regions. This 
“military idolization” campaign was vital for the popularization of the Quotations across the 
country, as it urged civilians to regard the book as not simply a commodity, but an ideological 
necessity. The new era of “military worship” created explosive demand for the book from 
nationwide booksellers, so much that publication grew exponentially to 75 million in early 
1966.  Between 1966 and 1968 (the zenith of the Cultural Revolutiofn), demand skyrocketed, 14
and over 300 publishers within China were devoted to printing the Quotations and other volumes 
of Mao’s writing. An article in the People’s Daily newspaper (Renmin Ribao) claimed as many as 
740 million copies were produced in this two-year period. Some contemporary foreign observers 
later claimed that the Quotations, at one point, had outsold the Bible worldwide. It certainly 
could be concluded that the book had become the “bible” of the Chinese masses.  
 “More on PLA Order Regarding Study of Mao,” Beijing NCNA Domestic Service, May 11, 1966.12
Ralph L. Powell, “Commissars in the Economy: "Learn from the PLA" Movement in China,” Asian Survey 5 13
(1965): 126.
 Leese, Mao Cult, 117.14
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 The Quotations rapidly became the foremost emblem of both revolution and obedience 
in China. Large swathes of text were painted on the walls of buildings, and propaganda posters 
often featured characters holding or studying the book. The Quotations proved especially popular 
among the Red Guards, student cadres comprised primarily of middle- and high-school aged 
teenagers who formed the paramilitary social movement in 1966. Fanatically devoted to Mao’s 
word, it was a common sight for crowds of Red Guards to march together, holding up copies of 
the Quotations and waving it above their heads while chanting “Long live Chairman Mao!” 
Encouraged by the chairman himself to overthrow local social and political structures, the Red 
Guards primarily asserted their given power through tactics ranging from public beatings of 
“intellectuals” to destruction of Chinese cultural and historic sites. It also became part of their 
duty to ensure that all citizens carried a copy of the Quotations — punishment could even be 
administered to those who failed to keep one on their person in public.  As the Cultural 15
Revolution wore on, the book took on the attributes of its most outspoken readers, becoming a 
prominent part of the Red Guard arsenal. The Quotations soon became symbolic of the dogmatic 
aspects of Mao philosophy, as well as its underlying brutality.  
Lin Biao’s influence over the Quotations, and thus, the primary method for how China 
studied Mao thought, came to an abrupt end in 1971. That same year, he fell out of Mao’s favor 
and was officially disavowed by the rest of the CCP. After Lin’s mysterious death in a plane 
accident over Mongolia, his foreword was scrubbed from every subsequent edition of the book, 
civilians and publishers alike tearing pages out from pre-existing copies for fear of being 
 For more information about the Red Guard movement and its ramifications, see Andrew G. Walder, Fractured 15
Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Guobin Yang, The 
Red Guard Generation and Political Activism in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
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associated with the disgraced marshal.  The Quotations proved to be just as potent of an 16
ideological symbol as it was a reflection of the turmoil within the Chinese Communist Party 
during the twilight of Mao’s reign.  
The Quotations’ potency was, however, short-lived. The beginning of rapprochement 
with the United States in 1972 began eroding the power of anti-western sentiment of Maoist 
literary material, and 1976, the year of Mao’s death, marked the end of the chairman and the 
“old” CCP. Following a chaotic scramble for power in the next two years, publication of the 
Quotations halted under the leadership of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978.  The 17
book’s perception gradually shifted from that of a “must-have” to that of an outdated relic of a 
bygone age, and millions of copies were destroyed with this new belief in mind. Although Mao 
was gone, his cult had not faded. Subsequent “first-edition” printings in much smaller scale 
began again in 1993, the centenary of Mao’s birth.  In China today, the Quotations remains a 18
nostalgic symbol for some, and is viewed as a piece of Communist kitsch for others. 
 
The “Little Red Book” in the United States 
 Initially, the CCP labeled the Quotations as “internal reading” and did not intend it to be 
sold overseas. The Party’s internal documents, revealed that, in 1966, it was “strictly forbidden” 
to sell the book to foreigners. The State Council Foreign Affairs Department initially justified the 
 Oliver Lei Han, “Sources and Early Printing History of Chairman Mao’s ‘Quotations,’” Bibsite: The 16
Bibliographical Society of America, January 10, 2004. 
 “Paramount leader,” or zuigao lindao, refers to the most prominent political leader in contemporary Chinese 17
politics without regard for their official title, position, or lack thereof. This term came into common use with Deng 
Xiaoping’s rise to power in the late 1970s.
 Ibid.18
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decision, suggesting that the summarized quality of the book made it not “comprehensive” 
enough to fully explain Mao Zedong thought.  However, this did not stop citizens from 19
exchanging the book with foreigners, or for foreign visitors to seek out copies. The book’s 
distribution through private channels (in particular, via personal gift-giving) eventually spurred a 
change of heart and subsequently international distribution. International translation and 
distribution of the book added yet another symbolic facet to the Quotations: as a symbol of 
Communist Chinese soft power.   20
Published primarily through the Beijing Foreign Language Press, Chinese publishers 
began producing translated books with the publication of the Second Edition in 1967. Translated 
books, in languages including but not limited to French, Russian, Hindi, and Indonesian, were 
made available through limited channels, primarily at state-run “friendship stores” overseas.  21
Chinese newspapers triumphed stories of the book used among foreign allies, publishing stories 
of Maoist political groups and even soccer teams gathering into PLA-style groups to read from 
the Quotations.  Visiting Communists were presented with copies of the Quotations at pro-Mao 22
rallies.  The translated books, in the eyes of the CCP propaganda machine, now celebrated 23
international kinship through the little tome that could be shared and discussed among so many.  
 Leese, Mao Cult, 119. 19
 Defined by Harvard professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the 1980s, soft power refers to the ability of a country to 20
persuade and attract others without the use of coercion or force (hard power). For more information, see Joseph S. 
Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80, Autumn 1990, 153-171.
 There is no substantiated number as to how many books were shipped overseas; Beijing’s New China News 21
Agency gave an unsubstantiated claim of “over 800,000 in 117 countries and territories” as of 1967. From “Names 
and Faces in the News,” The Boston Globe, July 3, 1967.
 “Mao Woks Featured At Football Game.” The Washington Post, Nov 7, 1966.22
 “Foreign Friends: Reportage on May Day Celebrations in Peking,” Peking NCNA International Service, May 1, 23
1967.
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Despite the fractured diplomatic relations between the United States and China during the 
1960s, copies of the Quotations were disseminated to the United States. Initially, it appears to be 
unusual that the CCP chose to ship pro-Maoist literature to a decidedly anti-Communist enemy 
nation, as the United States refused to recognize the Communist People’s Republic of China as 
the official government of China after the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949.  In order to explain 24
this discrepancy, it is necessary to consider how Chinese government officials saw China’s then-
current place in the world.  
The CCP’s stance on foreign relations established China as a third party unaffiliated 
neither with the U.S. nor the Soviet Union, the latter with which the CCP had experienced a deep 
ideological split and severed diplomatic relations in the early 1960s. In his essay “On New 
Democracy,” Mao established three major state systems in the world: republics under bourgeois 
dictatorship led by the United States; republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the 
Soviet Union; and “transitional” republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary 
classes. China, he determined, was a member of the third group, which consisted primarily of 
former colonial and semi-colonial states in the midst of revolution.  This idea, known as the 25
Three Worlds Theory, was first introduced by Mao in 1940, in the midst of the Second Sino-
Japanese War. Although he likely had not considered China a “leader” of this exploited group in 
1940, his definition of the so-called Three Worlds Theory proved to be a flexible definition over 
 The Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) was recognized as the legitimate government until the U.S., under the 24
Carter Administration, recognized the PRC and severed official relations with Taiwan on January 1st, 1979. 
 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume II (Beijing: Foreign Language 25
Press, 1940). 
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time.  The worlds and actions of the CCP during the zenith of the Quotations’ domestic and 26
international influence suggest an attempt by China to assert itself as an ideological world leader, 
and thus the “true” champion of Marxism. In this period, the People’s Republic had represented 
itself as a “third state system” that was separated from both the United States and its rival, the 
Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. continued to be tense, further 
exacerbated by a trading embargo placed by the U.S. and open conflict between American- and 
Chinese-backed forces in the then-ongoing Vietnam War.  
Despite these ongoing tensions, the Foreign Language Press began publishing English 
translations of the Quotations in 1966, with Chinese-English bilingual editions appearing in 
August 1967.  Copies of the “Little Red Book” were shipped in limited quantity to the United 27
States and sold in “friendship stores” primarily located on the West Coast.  This is where the the 28
Quotations truly transformed into soft power, diplomatic tools created to reshape American 
beliefs and opinions of China. Much like how soft power was used by the United States and 
Soviet Union to indirectly influence the thoughts and minds of neighboring states, the Chinese 
government desired to use the Quotations and similar material to attract foreigners to Maoism. 
Newspaper articles that boasted of Chinese-foreign friendship and cooperation also made certain 
to include numerous anecdotes of “foreign friends” raving over Mao, Maoism, and China’s 
“great proletarian revolution,” often elevating him not only as a guiding light for China, but for 
 For more information on the Three Worlds Theory and its use in the last 40 years, see Herbert S. Yee, “The Three 26
World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of National Affairs 
1944-) 59 (1983). 
 For the stereotype (metal mold) plate used for the first English language printing, see Appendix 4. 27
 Justin Schiller, interview by author, email message, August 13, 2016. 28
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the rest of the world.  The Brilliance of Mao Tse-tung’s Thought Illuminates the Whole World, a 29
book in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung series, was even dedicated to listing the students, 
revolutionaries, and proletariats from every major continent who integrated Mao thought into 
their daily lives. Foreigners from Japan to Ghana were depicted welcoming Chinese entourages 
with shouts of “Long live Mao Tse-Tung!” and gleefully accepting copies of the Quotations as 
gifts.  While these anecdotes were questionably truthful and more likely than not exaggerated, it 30
is true that substantial numbers of foreigners, including Americans, were drawn to Maoism 
during the late sixties through the use of exported literature.  
One section in The Brilliance of Mao Tse-Tung’s Thought is of particular interest, labeled 
“Mao Tse-Tung’s Thought Shakes the Capitalist World.” The section mentions Robert F. 
Williams, an African-American civil rights activist and writer. Williams was deeply inspired by 
Maoist thought and produced writings and developed armed self-defense tactics. When 
interviewed, he explained the following to his Chinese interviewers: “Who is it that most firmly 
supports us? We Negro brothers know best. It is Chairman Mao Tse-tung who most resolutely 
supports the struggle of our Negro brothers the world over.”   31
Despite the recurring criticism within the Quotations of the United States and American 
imperialism (with one particularly infamous chapter labeled “[U.S.] Imperialism and All 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers”), the editors of the book used Mao’s quotes to express sympathy 
 “Foreign Friends.”29
 Note that “Tse-Tung” was a common romanization of Mao’s name in written English until the 1990s, when the 30
hanyu pinyin system largely replaced the then-common Wade-Giles system in mainland China.
 The Brilliance of Mao Tse-Tung’s Thought Illuminates the Whole World (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1966), 31
13. 
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for American citizens suffering from oppression at home.  Of particular importance is a quote in 32
the chapter “Classes and Class Struggle”: 
...national struggle is a matter of class struggle. Among the whites in the United States, it 
is only the reactionary ruling circles that oppress the black people. They can in no way 
represent the workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals and other enlightened persons 
who comprise the overwhelming majority of the white people.   33  
There is thus a division between the American “capitalists” and the common citizens not 
complicit in “imperialist” actions overseas. Described as “enlightened persons,” the context of 
this quote suggests that these Americans could be good, reasonable people and thus Maoist 
sympathizers. It can thus be concluded that this was the mindset that CCP publishers held when 
sending translated English editions of the Quotations to the United States: that despite the 
national-level political misgivings between the two countries, China could successfully influence 
Americans through distribution of the Quotations. American leftists and political radicals 
dissatisfied with the then-current state of American society, including African-American political 
leaders like Robert Williams, were more susceptible to Mao thought and were thus of particular 
interest to the CCP.  
In the United States, civil unrest underlined by the increasingly controversial war in 
Vietnam had led to mass ideological fracturing within American society. Radical individuals and 
organizations, ranging from Asian nationalists to socialist militant groups, from across the United 
States drew inspiration from the English editions of the Little Red Book. The Black Panther 
 The quote in question is “...In the West imperialism is still oppressing the people at home. This situation must 32
change. It is the task of the people of the whole world to put an end to the aggression and oppression perpetrated by 
imperialism, and chiefly by U.S. imperialism.” From “6. Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,” 
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press 1966), PAGE NUMBER.
 “2. Classes and Class Struggle,” Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press 33
1966), 10.
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Party for Self-Defense was most directly responsible for the distribution of the Quotations across 
the country and bringing mainstream attention to the book. The BPP, as it was called, was a black 
nationalist association founded in Oakland, California by Bobby Seale and Huey Newton in 
1966. Like many other American radical groups of the time, they saw China as supporters of the 
black nationalist struggle. While it was far from the only left-wing radical group openly 
influenced by Mao thought, it was by far the most visible in the United States. Many of its 
members and predecessors first discovered Mao through the pro-Communist revolutionary 
struggles occurring in post-colonial Africa and Cuba during the 1950s and early sixties. China 
had supported such African anti-colonial struggles, stating in the Quotations that “[China] must 
give active support to the national independence and liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America as well as to the peace movement and to just struggle in all of the countries of the 
world”.   A pro-Maoist response to social unease and structural violence within the country, the 34
BPP’s protest tactics and language of self-defense, as powerful as they were controversial, drew 
inspiration from Chinese (particularly PLA and even Red Guard) materials. The Black Panther 
Party made substantial use of the Quotations during its formative years, and employed it for 
varying purposes: as an ideological tool, a commodity, and a symbol of defiance. As was true for 
other American radicals, the BPP was attracted to the Quotations’ lightweight portability and its 
organized, understandable language that was flexible enough to apply to American as well as 
Chinese concerns. The BPP sold paper copies of the book on college campuses as part of a 
fundraising campaign and made it required reading for all members. When Huey Newton was 
jailed under allegations of murder in 1967, “Free Huey” rallies organized in his honor saw 
 Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsy Esch, “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution,” Souls (1999), 12. 34
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groups of BPP members gathering together and participating in group studies of the Quotations, 
or organizing into large crowds and waving it in the air in the style of the Red Guards.  
Relations between the CCP and the Panthers were amicable, Mao having formally voiced 
his support for “Afro-American” liberation in a statement released in 1963.  Members of the 35
Black Panther leadership became part of the miniscule number of Americans to visit China 
between 1970 and 1971, months ahead of President Nixon’s historic visit to China. Huey Newton 
later recalled his ten-day visit in 1971 with a sense of awe, particularly when his visiting 
entourage was greeted with crowds of civilians waving “Little Red Books” and holding signs 
denoting their support of of Black Panthers and the American people.  However, the positive 36
sentiment towards leftist radicals was considerably less prevalent within the United States. The 
BPP was, in contrast, stereotyped and painted as “villains” and “militants” in local press.   37
Within the circle of American radicals, the Quotations did exactly what the CCP 
intended: to increase support for Maoism, and to exert Chinese influence overseas. Visitors to 
China itself were deeply influenced by the literature they had consumed beforehand; Newton, 
even when aware of the societal and environmental problems that developing China could run 
into, concluded that “Everything I saw in China demonstrated that the People’s Republic is a free 
and liberated territory...There was...little to find fault with.”  However, the book would not 38
remain exclusive to Maoist sympathizers for long. In fact, Americans had been made aware of 
 For more information, see Mao Zedong, “Statement Supporting the American Negroes In Their Just Struggle 35
Against Racial Discrimination by U.S. Imperialism,” Peking Review, August 8, 1963. 
 Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1973), 324. 36
 Jules Boykoff and Martha Gries, ““We're going to defend ourselves”: The Portland Chapter of the Black Panther 37
Party and the Local Media Response,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 111 (2010), 291-292.
 Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 326.38
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the Quotations’ existence for years before it was popularized by the BPP. To supplement the 
“friendship store” copies of the Quotations and the Black Panther copies, the first official 
American-published edition of the Quotations appeared in March 1966, edited by China scholar 
Stuart Schram with a foreword by A. Doak Barnett.  Non-leftist American media would prove to 39
be less sympathetic to the book’s message, if not outright hostile to this piece of “Communist 
propaganda.” A 1967 article in the Chicago Tribune labeled the Quotations as “Mao’s Mein 
Kampf,” placing Mao’s quotes on the same level of Hitler’s autobiography.  A paperback edition 40
of the Quotations printed by the conservative Christian radio show Voice of Americanism 
described the text as “dull and terrifying… claims made by the sycophantic Red Chinese dupes,” 
warning on the cover “Danger! This book is Communist propaganda!”   41
Although it might be imagined that only American leftists were influenced by the 
Quotations, this is not accurate. Such preconceptions cannot truly encompass the breadth of 
American reactions and understandings of the Little Red Book, particularly during the late 1960s 
to mid-1970s and the volatility of Chinese-American relations during the same period.  
My thesis thus attempts to bridge two separate areas of scholarship within Chinese-
American relations: the effects of the “global sixties,” and America’s shifting perceptions of 
China.  This project builds off of Cook’s global history of the Quotations’ international 42
 Han, “Sources and Early Printing History.”39
 Clarence Petersen, “Paperbacks: Mao’s ‘Mein Kampf.” Chicago Tribune, March 26, 1967.40
 Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung (Danger! This Book is Communist Propaganda!) ed. 41
W.S. McBirnie (Glendale: Voice of Americanism), iii. 
 For a Chinese-centric perspective on the United States, please see Li Jie, “Changes in China’s Domestic Policy in 42
the 1960s and Sino-US Relations” in Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 ed. Robert S. 
Ross and Changbin Jiang (Cambridge: Harvard East Asia Center, 2002).
 16
propagation and Lovell’s exploration of the relationship between Maoism and international 
revolution, in particular drawing influence from Mullen’s study of the 1960s and 1970s 
American Afro-Asian resistance.  Previous scholarship, including that of Mullen, has 43
thoroughly reflected on the significance of the Quotations within specific circles of American 
society, particularly the book’s most probable audience: American political radicals sympathetic 
to Maoism. As is true with understanding the Quotations purely through the view of American 
newspapers and religious right, such specific focus lends itself to a narrow perception of the 
text’s diverse array of interpretations, and tends to ignore how non-Maoists lent their 
understandings (or lack thereof) to accentuate their own thoughts and beliefs. As such, I seek to 
complicate the narrative of American reflections on Maoist literature by moving beyond the 
Quotations’ most direct audience to examine instances of its usage that were not necessarily 
literal interpretations but artistic, literary, and scholarly analyses that may have had subtle rather 
than explicit connotations and agendas.  
In reference to American historical perceptions of China, my thesis primarily builds on 
three major publications: Isaac’s interviews of American political officials during the 1950s, 
which analyzed how American political and military leaders built up stereotypes of China; 
Jespersen’s research on pre-1949 American media conceptions of China, which explored 
American fascination and interaction with Chinese images and people; and Haddad’s analysis of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American understandings of Chinese exported product, which 
further discussed how Chinese artisans constructed images of themselves to cater to the 
 Bill Mullen, “Quotations from Chairman Mao and the Making of Afro-Asian Radicalism, 1966-1975,” in Mao’s 43
Little Red Book: A Global History ed. Alexander Cook (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Julia Lovell, 
“The Cultural Revolution and Its Legacies in International Perspective,” The China Quarterly (227), September 
2016, pp. 632 – 652.
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preconceived notions of an American audience and thus exerted control over their own 
representation — a feat that, centuries later, continued to reflect China’s role in actively shaping 
its own image.  I also introduce a new perspective on Li Jie’s reflections of how domestic and 44
diplomatic events occurring within China may have helped shape U.S.-China relations by 
studying how shifting American perceptions of China may have also changed understandings of 
the Quotations over time.  My work differs from these previous analyses by examining a 45
significant and controversial exported literary product and placing its American-centric social-
cultural impact in the foreground, while also recognizing the importance of contemporary 
politics in influencing individual understandings of the Quotations.  
Although the Quotations will be the most extensively discussed work in these chapters, it 
cannot fully represent the extent to which images and representations of “Red China” permeated 
American society. The primary purpose of this project is to explore the dissemination of Mao and 
Maoism in the United States, in which the Quotations held an undeniably important role. In any 
case, it is impossible to separate the history of the Quotations in the United States from the 
history of “imported Maoism” and 1960s social struggle. Thus, this project will consolidate 
scholarly analyses of the Quotations alongside scholarly interactions with China, Maoism, and in 
certain examples, Mao himself. 
The following three chapters examine the influence and impact of the Quotations in three 
different venues of American society between 1967 and 1980, corresponding with the first 
 See T. Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); 44
Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches On Our Minds: American Images of China and India (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1958); John Rogers Haddad, The Romance of China: Excursions to China in U.S. Culture, 1776-1876 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008). 
 See Li Jie, Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia 45
Center, 2001). 
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appearance of the English-language Quotations in the United States and official rapprochement 
between China and the United States (and thus the “end” of the Quotations’ reign), respectively. 
The first chapter discusses the Quotations’ interpretation by American academic scholars and 
China experts, the second chapter examines political satire and parody based off of the 
Quotations, and the third chapter presents visual and literary interpretations of the Quotations by 
artists, playwrights, and other media creators. Internationally-inclined Americans of diverse 
political, cultural, and social backgrounds were deeply influenced by Quotations from Chairman 
Mao Tse-Tung and similar material exported from Maoist China, which itself was actively 
working to shape American hearts and minds towards greater support for Mao’s regime. Between 
1967-1980, Americans were influenced by the Quotations’ unique structure, language, and 
rhetoric while employing the book, its image and ideas to produce their own understandings of 
Mao, Cultural Revolution-era China, and the tumultuous countercultural movements of the mid-
century United States.  
Chapter One reflects on scholarly interpretation of the Quotations and similar works by 
American professors, students, and other academics working in China or East Asian studies, with 
a particular focus on the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), a left-leaning and 
Maoism-sympathetic group of academics formed in protest of American actions in the Vietnam 
War. The chapter further explores Maoism’s influence on the beliefs of disenchanted scholars, 
and subsequent conflicts that appeared among different generations of academics regarding the 
study of contemporary China. Younger researchers took issue with their superiors’ interpretations 
of Chinese history, and debated topics of war, revolution, and imperialism primarily through 
writing. The study of the Quotations and similar Maoist material would not only impact 
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academic understandings of new China, but also how radical scholars inadvertently began to 
shift from a western-centric approach of understanding China to a China-centric, imperialism-
critical approach that continues to shape modern approaches to China studies. 
Chapter Two focuses on the usage of the Quotations in satire and parody by American 
writers, along with how media saturation of images of “Red China” shaped and influenced 
American popular media. It analyses how writers, ranging from college students to full-time 
novelists, utilized the recognizable structure and language of the book in order to lampoon or 
uplift varying political figures ranging from President Richard M. Nixon to conservative 
commentator William F. Buckley Jr. to Mao’s successor, Chairman Liu Shaoqi. The Quotations 
became a template for these frustrated writers working to impart criticism — towards Mao, 
China, the United States, and, in one particular example, the state of society itself.  
Chapter Three discusses the origins of Mao’s, and ultimately the Quotations’, 
significance within American art and culture. The chapter focuses on two particular artists: 
Playwright Edward Albee, who wrote Box and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (not to 
be confused with the Little Red Book) in 1967; and Pop artist Andy Warhol, who created two art 
series that emulated different aspects of the Quotations: the Mao series of 1971-73, based off the 
infamous Mao portrait lifted from the Quotations, and the Little Red Book series of 1971-1975, 
which was inspired by the book’s portable qualities and mass production aesthetic. These artists 
and American citizens made use of the limited, slanted information they received from American 
news coverage to formulate their own understandings of Mao, Maoism, and China, which they in 





Maoism in American Academia 
The advent of the Cultural Revolution led to a mad scramble among Western experts to 
ascertain what, with the limited knowledge available, was going on in China. The Quotations 
and Maoism became part of a greater discussion among academics about the state of social 
upheaval and political revolution in both China and the United States. However, not all agreed on 
how to interpret the restricted information coming out of China. Left grasping at straws by the 
lack of information regarding contemporary China, scholars searched for methods of piecing 
together, through the Little Red Book and its contemporaries, a cohesive narrative of China, Mao 
Zedong, and Mao thought. The Quotations became one field of analysis in which scholars 
worked to redefine modern China’s new role and the methods as to how American academia was 
to comprehend “new” China. 
Whether by coincidence or spurred by the actions of the unorthodox Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), the Quotations emerged during a period of extreme social unrest in the United 
States and subsequently great debate within the East Asian studies scholarly community. During 
this period, Chinese revolutionary messages became ingrained into radical left-wing academic 
circles, providing a new language of instruction and granting a different venue of understanding 
for which frustrated young university students and researchers utilized to broadcast a new, anti-
imperialist message of scholarly revolution within American academia. Scholars split along 
generational lines as radical academics clashed with the “old guard” over interpretations of 
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China that the radicals considered outdated or pro-imperialist. Some of these young scholars, 
incensed by academic debate and the tumultuous political climate in the United States, formed 
Maoist-sympathetic political organizations like the Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars 
(CCAS). Their study of Maoist material, whether it was through the Quotations or other sources, 
helped to nurture and promote a pro-CCP agenda that influenced how CCAS politicized China’s 
image, and how American scholars, regardless of their respective stances, shaped and 
modernized China studies leading into the latter half of the 20th century.  
Between 1967 and 1970, China scholars from various backgrounds and beliefs presented 
their respective analyses of the Cultural Revolution, but many came to similar conclusions: that 
the future — and thus, the legacy — of the unprecedented movement was too uncertain to 
predict. In his 1970 evaluation of “China’s new socialism,” Bruce Douglass predicted “a return 
to the original aspirations behind the original [Bolshevik] socialist idea,” but ultimately 
concluded that China’s flavor of socialism, tying together the original Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy with industrialization, was too novel to draw any firm conclusions.  He wrote, “Are 46
the social and spiritual ideals of the original vision really compatible with industrialism? ...the 
Chinese Communists simply assert that they are. But it remains assertion, not yet explained or 
demonstrated.”   47
Douglass’s skepticism was not unwarranted, particularly with the aforementioned lack of 
information regarding the Cultural Revolution’s policies. If the how (implementation of Cultural 
Revolution policy) was not discernible, the why was more widely available in the form of literary 
 Bruce Douglass, “The Socialist Tradition and China’s New Socialism” in China and Ourselves: Explorations and 46
Revisions by a New Generation, ed. Bruce Douglass and Ross Terrill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969-1970), 225. 
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compilations like Quotations by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. As familiarity with the Quotations 
grew and spread among the American public, its unprecedented appearance became a part of 
discussion and debate among American academic scholars, particularly students, researchers, and 
professors in China or East Asian studies.  
 This chapter draws inspiration from the theory first established by Richard Madsen. In his 
book China and the American Dream, Madsen suggests that American academia was divided 
three major “camps” of China scholars between 1960 and 1980: the “conservative” camp, which 
made up much of the “old guard” who allegedly held on to old, outdated myths of new China as 
a threatening Communist aggressor; the “radical” camp, which consisted of institutions and 
individuals allegedly seeking to redefine the People’s Republic in positive terms, often 
influenced by way of CCP informative and propagandistic sources like the Quotations; and the 
“liberal center,” which maintained a neutral, cautious stance that considered the American-led 
fight against communism necessary, yet remained wary of some of the methods used to contain 
communism.  Although not all scholars fit into or even considered themselves part of Madsen’s 48
groupings, flying accusations tended to group individuals into certain camps more often than 
others. I also seek to complicate Madsen’s analysis of this debate among camps by suggesting 
that in the midst of this internal debate, there were external influences actively seeking to sway 
scholarly opinions of China: China itself, specifically the Chinese Communist Party, by way of 
literary propaganda disseminated into the United States and through invitations for scholarly 
groups to visit the then-reclusive country.  
 Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 48
1995), 39-40, 81-82, 91-93. 
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 The “conservative” camp is in itself a misleading term, as scholars (often accused of the 
term by members of the liberal camp) belonging to this group included giants in China studies 
who had been established in the field for decades, and thus may certainly have held less 
“modern” views towards their country of study, in particular the infamous “impact-response” 
model of Fairbank’s Harvard School. This does not suggest, however, that their views were 
orientalist or pro-imperialist or that their beliefs regarding China studies were not invulnerable to 
change over time. Arguably, many of these individuals may have belonged in Madsen’s “liberal 
center,” but were accused by radicals by virtue of being “not progressive enough.” This chapter 
analyzes the individuals in question (including but not limited to Schram, Barnett, John Fairbank, 
and John DeFrancis) and organizations (The American Historical Association, to name an 
example), with a particular focus on two aspects of their studies: academic publishings and 
annotations of the Quotations, and the academic conflict that ensued between the so-called 
“conservative” and “radical” factions — and often, different generations — of China scholars.  
The radical camp is also an umbrella term, and thus in this chapter will be narrowed 
down to the analysis of one significant scholarly group, the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars (CCAS). An academic-political organization founded in 1968 by graduate students and 
university faculty dedicated to revising Asian Studies in an anti-imperialist, pro-internationalism 
light, the CCAS was a significant voice in promoting “radical” China studies. The CCAS trips to 
China between 1971 and 1974 will be examined in particular detail, especially in context to the 




Scholarly Understandings of the Little Red Book 
 Americans living in China during the Cultural Revolution were few in number, with 
many missionaries, diplomats, and other non-Chinese having been expelled or detained since the 
Communist takeover.  As such, comprehensive news from China was limited, often obscured by 49
propaganda or simple lack of evidence. One of the challenges of documenting contemporary 
Chinese history for scholars in the late 1960s and early 70s was compiling the story of the 
Cultural Revolution through a piecemeal network of limited foreign journalism from Beijing and 
state-run news sources. The dearth of data, however, did not prevent their analyses of what little 
information was available. Although details of the Cultural Revolution were not made fully 
available to the international public until the late 1970s, western scholars had formulated their 
own interpretations of the chaos that had become Chinese national politics. The sheer amount of 
sensational propaganda stemming from China along with evidence of the CCP’s previous 
‘failures’ in maintaining order led some western scholars to conclude that the Cultural 
Revolution was in danger of failure.  
University of Glasgow researchers Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, in a critical 
response to what they gleaned of Mao’s decisions, suggested that the People’s Republic had been 
built upon shaky economic and fiscal foundations. Although they primarily focused on 
discussing economic policy in Chinese Communism in Crisis, Gray and Cavendish did note the 
power of ideological literature in strengthening Chinese domestic unity. Pointing towards the 
rising issues that may have arisen from drawing inspiration from Soviet attempts at 
 The small number of foreigners permitted to live in China, including Mao’s supporters, were often targeted during 49
the Cultural Revolution for their association with “imperialist” nations or for other reasons. For more information, 
see Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 
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collectivization and labor exploitation, Gray and Cavendish suggested that a diverse combination 
of socioeconomic struggles contributed to party infighting in the late 1950s and early 60s. As 
reuniting the factionalized CCP would require great effort in manufacturing and coalescing 
support, the influx of “Mao thought” writing and campaigns in subsequent years could be 
interpreted as an attempt to establish national unity.  
Gray and Cavendish further argued that works like the Quotations were a vague 
“distillation” of Mao thought meant to ensure greater understanding of Mao’s goals among the 
relatively uneducated masses. The Glasgow researchers concluded that the Quotations was a 
piece of work specifically meant to address “Chinese problems,” a “response to Chinese 
circumstances… generally misunderstood in the West.”  What would strike a Western reader as 50
“extreme” or “totalitarian” would, according to their observations, have actually stemmed from 
centuries of Chinese philosophy and political thought. However, in line with their skepticism of 
Chinese government policy, they further argued that the “public morality” that formed the 
backbone of the Quotations was “fraudulent” and consisted of perverted Confucian ideals within 
a Marxist system: ultimately, an unstable combination.  Still, they concluded, the ultimate 51
message was quite powerful; “one must appreciate the strength and persistence of China’s elitist, 
bookish, and bureaucratic habits of thought.” Gray and Cavendish’s observations later became 
part of an underlying point of contention among other scholars, particularly researchers studying 
the Quotations and considering its possible relevance to ongoing events in and outside the United 
States. Was it appropriate, they wondered, to consider what was going on in China a new 
 Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution (London: 50
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beginning for the country, or merely another chapter in its long and turbulent dynastic history? 
Scholars would struggle with these questions for the next decade, working to answer them 
through multiple perspectives.  
 Several American scholarly publications and annotations of the Quotations appeared in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, published both in competition with and alongside the “official” 
Beijing Foreign Language Press edition also being distributed in the United States. The first 
officially published American edition of Quotations by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung appeared in 
1967, edited and annotated by esteemed Mao scholar Stuart Schram with a foreword by 
journalist and political scientist A. Doak Barnett. Certain editions were bound in bright red, the 
covers extolling the book (in large yellow letters) as “the most powerful — and challenging — 
document of the century!” 
Printed significantly larger than the pocket-size Beijing Foreign Language Press edition 
of the Quotations, the sensationalist language of the Schram edition cover was clearly meant to 
draw in American readers curious about Mao’s unusual tome. In the chapters preceding Mao’s 
quotes, Schram and Barnett took a deeply critical tone towards the Quotations and its 
implications in both China and the international arena. Barnett described the Quotations as a 
centerpiece of Mao’s unprecedented “massive [sic] reindoctrination campaign,” while Schram 
compared it to the likes of holy texts like the Quran.  Furthermore, both scholars drew attention 52
to the significance of the book’s international circulation, evaluating its probable usage in the 
subsequent decade. Schram acknowledged the book’s possible appeal among anti-imperialist 
 A. Doak Barnett, “Foreword,” from Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Stuart Schram (New York: 52
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Tung, ed. Stuart Schram (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), vii. 
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forces around the world, citing developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
“humiliated” by American interventionism. “China,” he wrote, “appears to be the only nation 
with both the will and the power to resist American domination of world affairs.”  Barnett, 53
addressing hypothetical reader concerns or disinterest in reading “Maoist dogma,” suggested that 
American citizens needed to bolster their own education in order to better understand the forces 
at work within this rival nation. Americans could thus put the book to good use and improve their 
“understanding of the forces now at work [in Cultural Revolution-era China].”   54
Nonetheless, both scholars, like their contemporaries, were faced with significant gaps in 
evidence and could only guess at what could await China in later years. Barnett had also 
authored China After Mao in 1967, evaluating the challenges that could face Chinese leaders 
after Mao’s inevitable death. Much like Schram, Barnett considered the Quotations a sort of 
“holy text” that was followed by the Communist regime. His concern over China’s indeterminate 
future was also reflected in the foreword, where he concluded that in the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution, “scripture” like the Quotations would provide the baseline for Communist Chinese 
ideology and policy for years to come. “Whoever wins the struggle [over China’s future],” he 
stated, “...are likely to appeal to — and quote — concepts and sayings that are included in this 
book.”   55
Schram, too, was deeply critical and skeptical of the rosy worldview presented through 
the Quotations. The editor’s notes that followed the translated text served two primary purposes: 
 Ibid, xxii. 53
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to point out omitted and edited sections of text from different editions, and to point out 
hypocrisies in Mao’s words. In his essay preceding the translated text, he analyzed several 
passages from Mao’s Selected Works (many of the more famous sayings were distilled into the 
Quotations) and concluded that Mao’s repeated emphasis on “struggle and drama 
and...conviction” was largely irrational. He continued, “These attitudes are likely to prove less 
appropriate to...the complex problems of a modernizing society than they were to [Mao’s] 
experience in the Chingkang Mountains.”  If this was to be the official “scripture” of the 56
Cultural Revolution, which Schram conceded at least had a few “excellent aims,” then it was 
unlikely that the movement would successfully accomplish its goals. In Schram’s eyes, the 
Cultural Revolution (which he rarely refers to as such in the essay, seemingly preferring “the 
revolution” or “the Chinese Revolution”) contradicted itself in that it encouraged readers to 
apply Mao’s works “in a creative way” while simultaneously pushing them to think only 
“correct” thoughts.  Ultimately, he inferred, “it is highly doubtful whether such a Spartan 57
philosophy can long maintain its hold even in China itself, still less in Africa or Latin 
America.”  58
While the Schram/Barnett edition was packaged for public perusal, certain American-
edited copies were structured for serious academic review for a highly specific audience. John 
DeFrancis’s Annotated Quotations from Chairman Mao is one such example. The Schram/
 Schram, “On the Quotations,” xi. Schram refers here to the Jinggang Mountains, located between Jiangxi and 56
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Barnett version combined the Beijing Foreign Language English translation of the Quotations 
with accompanying essays from both scholars; in contrast, the DeFrancis edition produced the 
Quotations solely in Chinese with accompanying pinyin romanization. This book is intended, he 
wrote in the introduction, to “further facilitate Chinese language learning among students.”  59
While the Schram/Barnett version discussed in some detail the sociopolitical significance 
of the Quotations and its international connotations, DeFrancis seemed to spare little time on 
discussing the text in terms of its political meaning. University of Massachusetts linguistics 
professor Teng Shou-Hsin, in his review of DeFrancis, observed a “disturbing” trend within the 
reader that “glossed over” the component (Chinese) characters of proper names, particularly 
those of states and political leaders.  Instead, much of DeFrancis’s textual analyses focused on 60
treating the Quotations not as a political reader, but as a vehicle for learning the Chinese 
language. More than half of the DeFrancis edition is taken up by translations of Chinese terms 
and idioms, with only a select number of terms directly referencing the names of Chinese 
Communist party leaders or ideological jargon.  
DeFrancis noted in the introduction that he chose to annotate the Quotations because of 
its repetitive qualities, with the author “hammer[ing] away at the points he wishes to get across.” 
This is the closest that DeFrancis got within the annotated volume to making any political 
commentary regarding the Quotations’ messages. While one can only surmise what DeFrancis 
was intending with this avoidance of discussing contemporary Chinese politics, as he simply 
states that he intends the book to be “used” by “students at various levels of language 
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competence,” it is evident that the Quotations underwent some sort of depoliticization under 
DeFrancis’s pen.  Although this may or may have not been deliberate on DeFrancis’s part (he 61
was, after all, a linguist) the segregation of historic and literary analysis from contemporary 
political discussion that was so common among academics would contribute to growing rifts 
among China studies scholars. 
Although Madsen’s grouping of scholarly stances is crucial in that it helps to highlight 
divisions, the metaphorical “lines in the sand” between scholars of the period, “conservative,” 
“liberal,” and “radical,” are ultimately subjective terms that were often thrown around as 
accusations. Perhaps the most accurate way to consolidate the breadth of China-centric 
frameworks utilized in American academia is by two major categories: the “impact-response” 
model that was first elaborated upon in John K. Fairbank’s influential China’s Response to the 
West, and the more contemporary anti-imperialist model that was espoused in challenge to the 
impact-response model by newer scholars.  
Fairbank (1907-1991) had been actively studying Chinese history since the 1920s, and 
during the Vietnam era was well-established as the founder of modern China studies at Harvard 
University. The impact-response model was shaped by Fairbank and his contemporaries, and it 
became the hallmark of his so-called “Harvard School” of Chinese historiography in the late 
1940s. Succinctly put, this framework places China in the role of the passive responder, reacting 
and developing only as the West influenced China and the rest of the East. Paul Cohen, one of 
Fairbank’s former students, describes this as the “Western impact” and “Eastern response” 
 DeFrancis, Annotated Quotations, ix. 61
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model.  Fairbank elaborated on this seemingly one-sided relationship in his book The United 62
States and China, arguing that the technological advancement that began in the late eighteenth-
century West allowed it to continuously modernize from within; China, on the other hand, did 
not exist within the boundaries of Western innovation and was compliant to what innovations 
and demands came from the West.  Furthermore, although Chinese society had once surged 63
ahead of Europe in terms of scientific innovation, Fairbank suggested that a potent historical 
mixture of “tyrannical” language, scholarly fixation on spiritual matters, and the “Confucian 
straitjacket” had ultimately caused China to lag behind.  In other words, the West’s 64
technological superiority naturally made it the primary shaper of modern Chinese history, while 
any response from the Chinese could only be attributed to decisions or responses to the West. If 
China was to grow and develop into a twentieth-century nation, it was not adequate enough for it 
to modernize; it had to westernize. The impact-response model would be a crucial building block 
of the “modernization theory” that was championed by many of the colleagues in Fairbank’s 
generation, which would be met with scorn by others, including several of his own students.  
Radicals, in contrast, scorned the impact-response model as overly western-centric and 
smacking of imperialist rhetoric. Furthermore, subscribers to anti-imperialist models utilized 
their criticism to further denounce their scholarly superiors. In the event that, perhaps, first 
ignited the inter-scholarly drama of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Harvard graduate student 
James “Jim” Peck published “The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America’s 
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China Watchers” in a 1969 issue of The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars accusing leading 
China scholars of being both lofty and elitist. According to Peck, modernization theory was an 
ideological construct that was used to justify “the [post World War II American] involvement in 
the domestic affairs of numerous East Asian nations.”  Drawing primarily from the combined 65
work of Fairbank and his fellow Harvard professor, Japan and East Asia scholar Edwin O. 
Reischauer, Peck argued that, although modernization theory recognized the negative influence 
of imperialism in Chinese history, its longstanding effects were ultimately downplayed in favor 
of American interests in modernizing and assimilating East Asia. China, meanwhile, was 
stereotyped by these “China watchers,” as Peck called them, as being too rebellious and stubborn 
to listen, which would lead to its gradual downfall. In unspoken support of violent social change 
like the Cultural Revolution, Peck accused his superiors of clinging onto the notions of a world 
order where the United States was situated safely at the top. “For American interests,” he wrote 
with underlying sarcasm, “are incompatible with violent upheavals; as they see it, we live in a 
world where ‘violence is too dangerous.’” He contrasts these hesitant scholars with the 
“revolutionary Marxists” who were in the process of “modernizing” China, suggesting that 
“order, like violence, is politically defined...the conceptions of orderly and nonviolent change 
only reflect the interests of those powerful enough to enforce their definitions upon the 
population.”  66
Ultimately, scholarly reactions to China varied on individual accounts. Some, like Barnett 
and Schram, expressed their skepticism as to the effectiveness of the sociopolitical upheaval; 
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others, like DeFrancis, remained hesitant in bringing contemporary politics into historical 
discussion. Many other, oft-younger scholars dissatisfied with previous methods of historical 
understanding began to search for new venues for comprehending Communist China, either 
working to fit it into a new chapter of China studies or revamping the field and viewing the 
country through a completely different lens. Unlike their older counterparts, these young scholars 
also expressed a tendency to accept the propaganda coming from China as truthful, going 
“against the grain” by espousing the narrative created by the CCP. Perhaps the loudest voices 
within young academia were members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The next 
section will detail some of these deeply personal clashes, which often pitted teachers against 
students in an intellectual battle over the future of China studies, which was influenced in no 
small part by China itself. 
 
China and the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars  
The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) had formed in response to two 
major events: American participation in the ongoing Vietnam War, and hesitance from the 
Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in issuing a response to the conflict. Although initially a 
much smaller organization than the AAS, the CCAS rapidly grew and expanded across college 
campuses in the United States, eventually boasting dozens of chapters in major research 
universities from coast to coast by the 1970s. Initially, it had formed in response to the conflict in 
Vietnam; however, the organization’s interests soon broadened to much of Asia. In 1969, the 
CCAS issued its statement of purpose: 
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[The CCAS] seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian 
societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity…We realize that to be students of 
other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them. CCAS wishes to create 
alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a 
parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our 
organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both 
Asian and Western scholars…  67 
In seeking to create alternative scholarship of modern China, CCAS members developed 
a stance towards the country that was decidedly more pro-government and pro-Cultural 
Revolution than the mainstream stance that had grown from decades of anti-communist 
sentiment and international unease. It may be tempting to dismiss the CCAS understanding of 
then-modern China as idealism or naivete, and indeed it was a certain uninformed optimism —
and righteous anger towards outdated modes of historical interpretation — that drove these 
younger scholars towards positive portrayals of China.  
 The hesitance of major scholarly organizations to enter the political realm spurred the 
creation of groups like CCAS and fueled mass debate among scholars over the subject. James 
Peck’s infamous essay “The Roots of Rhetoric” provoked a stern critical response from John 
Fairbank. Fairbank and Peck’s written debate, a battle between teacher and student, was 
published in full in The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. As previously described, Peck had 
accused Fairbank and his contemporaries of supporting an outdated model of China studies that 
conflated revolution with irrational violence and stressed the importance of “American interests” 
at the detriment of the Chinese, thus making them as guilty of anti-Communist sentiment as 
many of the policy makers in the U.S. government. Fairbank neither explicitly confirmed nor 
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denied the accusation, but instead chose to consider himself in “general agreement” with Peck’s 
article while also pointing out “dangerous” generalizations in Peck’s arguments. 
 In his response, Fairbank acknowledged Peck’s concerns about “cultural imperialism...as 
part of our [American?] cancerous growth and expansion,” but also accused him of lumping 
together the opinions of all mid-20th century China scholars with John Foster Dulles, the former 
Secretary of State under the Eisenhower Administration who had pursued a vehemently anti-
Communist agenda. Chinese historiography had changed dramatically in the last few centuries, 
Fairbank argued, to the point where “China experts could... be classified according to the time 
when they entered the field, just as one could tell in the treaty ports when a foreign woman had 
left her homeland by looking at the style of her clothes.” He elaborated:  
 
“China-watchers have never been a unified group… Their historical efforts have only 
marginally influenced American policy formation, which is only semi-rational at best. 
(Professors are not so important outside universities.) Mr. Peck is also a China-watcher 
now, not merely a watcher of China-watchers, and the hang-ups of the past call for his 
detailed unhinging, just as the [sic] inscrutabilities of the China Revolution still wait to be 
unscrewed.”  6869 
 Peck responded to Fairbank’s accusations with retorts of his own, especially that the field 
of China studies in the 1950s (during the establishment of the People’s Republic) was decidedly 
anti-Communist, regardless of political affiliation. In his eyes, both liberal and conservative 
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scholars ignored the corruption and ineptitude of the Nationalist government, formed a “subtle 
consensus” that “accepted a view of American society as the unambiguous leader of the ‘free 
world’,” and managed to simultaneously defend globalism and McCarthyism by keeping 
Communism in check through globalism while ensuring the safety of McCarthyist doctrine.  In 70
Peck’s eyes, American political leaders had been searching for methods to keep the Chinese 
Communists down and continue maintaining China as “theirs,” and its academics were no 
exception. Once the Communists seized power, China was, as many believed, “lost.” 
 How, then, could the U.S. safely contain China and hold on to its global dominance? 
Peck argued that Communist China had inaccurately been conceived as a beastial, totalitarian 
society that had unprecedented “control and elite manipulation of the masses.”  In fact, the 71
opposite was true; American mainstream rhetoric ignored or twisted the “truth” of the Chinese 
revolution. His interpretation of Mao doctrine immediately points to his positive understanding 
of the Cultural Revolution, a belief shared by his fellow CCAS members: 
  
Mao has repeatedly argued that liberation requires constant mutual education of leaders 
and led….local initiative undertaken within an ideology that provides meaning for the 
effort; and a radically active leadership which recognizes that liberation must come 
through education. It is with this approach towards social change...which has rarely 
received serious treatment. That it is viewed primarily as a manipulative and totalitarian 
approach may reflect far more about American observers than about the observed 
Chinese.  72 
Most inter-scholarly conflicts took place in written communication or scholarly articles, 





activist Howard Zinn wrestled with Fairbank for control of the microphone at an American 
Historical Association conference in what Fairbank would later call their “briefly-famous 
Struggle for the Mike.”  A year later, Brandeis Political Science professor I. Milton Sachs 73
allegedly objected to the presence of CCAS members at a “Southeast Asian Development 
Advisory Group” meeting and “stormed out” after vocally announcing his resignation from the 
group.  In the eyes of the conservatives and centrists, the CCAS was foolish for taking Mao’s 74
words at face value. In the eyes of radical scholars like the CCAS, the “old guard” of China 
studies were stubbornly grasping onto outdated, pro-imperialist discriminatory understandings of 
a foreign entity that granted the Chinese people little agency in their future. The People’s 
Republic, in contrast, was an agent of its own free will, and for some academics, even a potential 
model for international revolutionaries.  
 Not all examples of inter-scholarly interactions resulted in such violent altercations. 
Written evaluations of the new “radical studies” conducted by the CCAS and similar groups 
were met with a mixture of skepticism and reserved praise, suggesting that some peaceful 
exchange of ideas and beliefs among different scholarly circles had indeed occurred. East Asia 
historian and Harvard lecturer James C. Thomson Jr. reviewed China and Ourselves: 
Explorations and Revisions of a New Generation, Douglass and Terrill’s compilation of 
explorative essays on China in 1970. Thomson dubbed China and Ourselves as “refreshing and 
irritating,” an example of a new generation of scholarly work in the field. (The Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars is mentioned later as an example of radically inclined China studies, 
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refreshing but “also irritating.”) He reflected on the absence of “Cold War cant” that colored 
previous years of academic research and appreciated the application of “surprising insights from 
history, sociology, and even theology to the Chinese Revolution.”  On the other hand, Thomson 75
criticized the perspective or lack thereof of the younger scholars, pointing towards the tension-
ridden geopolitical environment of previous decades that had so deeply influenced earlier 
generations of China studies research: 
 
“What is irritating, and perhaps inevitable among these “children of Vietnam,” is a one-
sidedness in the authors’ views of both China and America. The young remember Joe 
McCarthy, Dulles, Chiang Kai-Shek, and the Vietnam War. They tend to forget Stalinist 
totalitarianism, the Korean invasion, and what seemed to be the mortal threat of 
monolithic Communism.”  76 
 Thomson’s observations, along with Fairbank’s arguments and DeFrancis’s academic 
annotations of the Quotations, reflect two major themes that academics struggled to answer 
during this time period: how to interpret new China, and how scholars would reshape China 
studies through direct and indirect interactions with Chinese material. In working to reinterpret 
China studies for the modern era, the CCAS, whether intentionally or not, also absorbed and 
reiterated some of the messages broadcasted by their foreign subject. They published books on 
China that reinterpreted Chinese history through a pro-revolutionary and anti-imperialist lens, 
proudly throwing off the cloak of modernization theory.  Several CCAS faculty members 77
engaged in self-criticism sessions not unlike that of the Chinese Red Guard, encouraging their 
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students to spend several minutes criticizing “themselves and each other” after class in order to 
better “see through Chinese eyes.”  Personal correspondence between members commonly 78
concluded letters with the endings “in struggle” or “in solidarity,” not only associating 
themselves with their Chinese subjects, but making them one and the same. Their eventual visits 
to China itself would, as they believed, penetrate the veil of mystery surrounding the country and 
grant Americans a more balanced insight into the Cultural Revolution.  
 
Americans Visit China 
 The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars were among a very small group of 
Westerners allowed to visit China during the Cultural Revolution. The few delegations permitted 
to enter the formerly isolated country were part of a greater campaign, especially on China’s part, 
to shape foreign hearts and minds. Heavily regulated by the CCP, Mao-era China’s “Track II 
diplomacy” included the leaders of radical social groups as well as individual journalists, writers, 
and researchers, all taken on national tours traversing strategic locations around the country.  79
Westerners allowed this opportunity fell into one of two major categories: leftists sympathetic to 
Maoism and journalists with visas seeking to peek into the inner machinations of the movement. 
As such, these tours were meant to leave foreign observers with the same impression: 
observations of then-modern China as a country that had been denigrated and villainized by 
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western media, one that had successfully implemented a Marxist-Leninist government system 
supported by loyal citizens. Indeed, some observers came away with positive impressions: Black 
Panther founder Huey P. Newton recalled his 1971 visit to China with an unparalleled sense of 
awe, writing that it was in China where he had felt “absolutely free for the first time in my life, 
completely free among my fellow men.”   80
 Although Newton attempted to moderate his words with a brief paragraph of criticism 
regarding China’s environmental and developmental policy, noting that “no society is perfect,” 
many other visitors maintained a greater level of skepticism regarding Chinese government 
portrayal of the Cultural Revolution. Journalists in particular were actively seeking opportunities 
to explore the then-isolated country, delving beyond what was provided by the government to 
seek the “truth” of the Cultural Revolution. 
 One particularly jarring analysis of late-1960s China came from Austrian journalist Louis 
Barcata, who published China In the Throes of Cultural Revolution in 1967 with an American 
release in 1968. A correspondent who had previously visited the country in the late 1950s, 
Barcata was deeply unsettled by the drastic changes that had taken place in “Red China.” Much 
of his visit was spent observing and interviewing Chinese civilians — children, loyal citizens, 
and “revisionist” outliers alike — about their experiences.  Unlike the young American radical 81
scholars, Barcata found the Maoist stance on American imperialism both horrific and 
hypocritical. Ultimately, he concluded that the Cultural Revolution had revealed a great 
weakness in Chinese politics, that Mao had opponents in both the army and the Central 
  Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1973), 320. 80
 Louis Barcata, China In the Throes of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Hart Publishing Company, 1968), 162, 81
170-171.
 41
Committee whose power and influence were yet unknown.  Despite Barcata’s ominous 82
reflections, it is evident that his concerns were not shared by American radicals, who, in contrast, 
were thrilled for the opportunity to experience new China for themselves.  
 The advent of the 1970s marked the first official talks of rapprochement between the 
Chinese and American national governments, starting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
secret visit to Beijing in June 1971 and President Richard Nixon’s official announcement of his 
plan to visit the People’s Republic a month later. Roughly around the same time, CCAS received 
its first invitation from the Chinese government to visit the People’s Republic. Despite the 
academic infighting, “conservative” and radical scholars had access to the same limited pool of 
information. As such, by the early 1970s, a number of American scholars had publicly come out 
in support of the Cultural Revolution, including Fairbank in 1972.  It was thus with great 83
excitement (and jealousy) that young scholars vied for spots in the first group of American 
academics to visit China in decades. The final group who made up the first entourage consisted 
primarily of academics in their twenties, students and teachers who, in their own words, 
“represented a new generation of China scholars.”   84
They published their 31-day experience touring China in the volume China! Inside the 
People’s Republic, hoping to shift American public opinion towards the favorable. The first 
entourage arrived in Hong Kong in summer of 1971, and passed over the border where they were 
greeted by members of the China Administration for Travel and Tourism. Upon reaching China, 
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the scholars were quickly saturated with images of China’s past: photos, galleries, and museums 
commemorating the “years of bitterness” and suffering that had befallen the Chinese people 
since the advent of the 20th century, as well as messages of how the Communist regime and 
subsequently the Cultural Revolution had transformed things for the better.  The scholars, under 85
careful supervision, toured numerous cities and villages, visiting schools, factories, hospitals, and 
laboratories where the Cultural Revolution was supposedly in “full swing.” Much to the delight 
of the CCAS, the visit concluded with a meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing, where they 
discussed foreign policy and Chinese-American relations, then presented the Chinese Premier 
with CCAS paraphernalia.  
The citizens the CCAS members spoke to — primarily students, soldiers, and other 
beneficiaries of the revolution — spoke at length of how following Mao doctrine was improving 
their lives; dissenting opinions were dismissed as “selfish ambition,” for the modern Chinese 
social system was first and foremost meant to “serve the people.”  Furthermore, the scholars as 86
a collective group did not recognize moments of cultural repression. For example, they 
acknowledged the notable decrease of creative writing in China since the 1950s and 60s, as well 
as the disappearance of most novels from national bookstores. However, with their lack of 
knowledge about the censorship and repression of Chinese media, this premonition was spun into 




Thus, it was a good thing for the Chinese to replace literature with “the forms of culture which 
can be enjoyed by anyone, literate or illiterate: the visual arts.”   87
This was not to say, however, that the entourage accepted everything that they saw as 
truth. Members were ultimately uncertain of what they had truly experienced in China; the 
writers of China! Inside the People’s Republic conceded that “not all of us agreed with each 
other.”  Moreover, every so often they witnessed events during their visit that left them troubled. 88
Despite the apparent gender equality in new China, they saw women, including local leaders, 
remain subservient to male members of their household; when visiting a space research center 
and questioning the resident scientists about their work, the Americans were given only answers 
about “the necessity of satellite research” that could only be described as “cryptic.”  William 89
Joseph, former CCAS member and current professor at Wellesley College, recalled visiting a 
Tianjin mental hospital during the organization’s 1972 visit and seeing patients undergoing 
therapy by reading the Quotations — a evident rejection of western mental health standards. 
“Although it was a little startling [to us],” he said, “it seemed to be a good thing — serving its 
purpose as a way of uniting the people.”  90
Still, the entourage returned to the United States carrying an overwhelmingly positive 
view of Mao’s China, and received significant attention in the scholarly community for their 
uncommon feat.  The 1972 CCAS visit was also well received, but the trips were not without 91
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their detractors. Older China scholars not involved with the organization were resentful that they 
were not afforded the same opportunity. Within CCAS, some members insisted that the 
organization should focus on its original mission in Vietnam. After Nixon’s China visit and the 
signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, the CCAS received an invitation for a third visit in 
1973.  Despite overwhelming demand for spots on the delegation, the trip proved controversial. 92
Members argued over whether or not to boycott the invitation because of China’s allegedly pro-
American foreign policy shift, which stood against their idealized preconceptions of the country 
that had been built from the pre-rapprochement years. When several CCAS activists gave public 
lectures criticizing China for “not living up to [their] expectations,” the Chinese government 
canceled the trip. Because of what was retrospectively dubbed “the imperialism of the left...there 
was never again to be an official visit to China by a delegation of the CCAS.”  The image of 93
revolutionary China, transmitted through material like the Quotations, had so deeply ingrained 
itself into the minds of CCAS scholars that they felt entitled to denigrating the resumption of 
relations between the U.S. and China, resulting in the loss of their own diplomatic privileges. 
 
New Revelations and the End of CCAS 
 Perhaps the most jarring news to the China studies community of the late 1970s, radical 
or not, was the “truth” of the Cultural Revolution coming to light after Mao’s passing and the rise 
of Deng Xiaoping. Formerly repressed horror stories of the movement recounted by Chinese 
 The Shanghai Communiqué (1972) was a joint document issued by both China and the United States promising 92
gradual normalization of Chinese-American relations. For details, see United States Information Service, “Joint 
Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China,” February 28, 1972.
 Madsen, China and the American Dream, 101.93
 45
civilians proved shocking to American academics, forcing many of them to reassess their 
previously “rose-tinted” views of what had been going on in China. In 1983, Stuart Schram 
revisited a 1968 quote accusing Mao of crimes against humanity on par with Stalin, which in his 
own words had “led me to be denounced at the time as an ‘anti-Chinese element.’ Now the 
evaluation just quoted would probably be regarded by many Chinese as if anything too 
indulgent.”  94
 CCAS members, among the most vocal supporters of the Cultural Revolution, were also 
reeling from shock at the unwelcome news. As vehement defenders and so-called dedicated 
scholars of “revolutionary” China, it was only after the damage was done when they realized the 
extent of the shallowness of their knowledge. Emotions were strong and varied — although 
many scholars remained defiant, some felt embarrassment, indignation, or shame over their 
actions. Another, more deeply critical member reflected on his colleagues: 
 
I was amazed at their confidence that they knew exactly what was happening and 
what it meant and that it had all of these consequences and implications...And so 
people who were going out there and wanting to tell me why a dictatorship was a 
wonderful kind of thing are not having very much of a positive impact on me...And 
the Cultural Revolution... as if it was telling us the better future for the human 
species. I mean, God, that's all beyond me.  95 
After 1972, the CCAS’s foundational goals had begun to erode. American military 
involvement in Vietnam officially ended in August of 1973; around the same period, the tentative 
beginnings of rapprochement commenced between the federal governments of China and the 
United States. With the understanding that the international realm was changing around them, the 
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scholarly organization searched for new venues of interest in the mid- to late-1970s. However, it 
was evident that the organization, with its goals of implementing anti-imperialist and 
unapologetically leftist academic policy, was gradually nearing its end. The CCAS evidently had 
faced some trouble with reaching out beyond the academic community. A letter addressed to 
historian Ruth Mischeloff described the difficulty in doing so, admitting that “with the exception 
of some individuals and chapters, CCAS people don’t know too much about community 
education to begin with.”  By 1975 and the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule, the 96
CCAS had by and large faded as an organization.  As has been outlined throughout this chapter, 97
most of its members would move on to become researchers and faculty at universities around the 
country, largely less radicalized than before. 
 Meanwhile, tensions among scholars had begun to simmer down, and respectful 
professional relationships were slowly but surely reestablished. In 1971, Joseph Escherick, a 
CCAS member and then a professor at the University of Oregon’s Department of History, had 
published a firm-handed critique of his former undergraduate mentor John Fairbank and the 
Harvard school, accusing the latter parties of imperialist apologism by way of allegedly 
supporting a pro-western paradigm that, as Escherick described, contributed to the social and 
economic destabilization of early modern China.  In 1978, in jarring contrast, Escherick sent a 98
cordial message to Fairbank requesting a reference for a University of Chicago position, 
commenting on his hopes that “you will not be offended or annoyed by this imposition from a 
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student from such a distant past — and such a disloyal student at that!”  Although Escherick 99
was keen on making amends, no records exist of Fairbank’s response — Esherick would later 
chair the Chinese Studies program at the University of California, San Diego. 
  
Reflections 
 The limited amount of information available for American scholars of China studies was 
deeply concerning all around, leading academics to scramble for methods to search for a stronger 
understanding of their reclusive subject. Even more of concern was the information actually 
available — scholars split along ideological and generational lines on how to interpret it, how to 
place it into the greater historical context, and simply on what was actually factual. While some 
older scholars were keen on taking a distant, objective stance on this deeply politicized chapter 
of Chinese history, younger far left-leaning scholars who were incensed by the revolutionary 
atmosphere of the late 1960s and deeply discontented with older methods of historiography were 
determined to pioneer a new chapter in China studies, with China — the new leader of the global 
revolution in their eyes — at the forefront. These academics not only studied “China,” but 
worked to “become” China, willingly incorporating Maoist doctrine into their speech and 
language. The Chinese Communist Party under Mao was also an active agent in encouraging this 
scholarly unruliness, leading to an affable if short-lived relationship that would dissipate amidst 
the progression of 1970s Cold War geopolitics.  
 The hopes that these young scholars, particularly the CCAS, laid upon China were 
constructed on unstable ground, but their anti-imperialist theoretical frameworks would be 
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improved upon and endure into the present day. Paul Cohen observed how the post-Cold War 
wave of “postmodern” scholars focused on “impassioned critique of colonialism,” the West, and 
the United States,” clearly making them “the spiritual descendents of the graduate students and 
young academics who formed the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars a generation ago.”  100
Cohen credited these “practitioners of the craft” with challenging the western-centric impact-
response model with a system that continues to drive China studies today. Despite their 
fundamental misunderstanding of modern China, the CCAS inadvertently advocated for a 
“China-centered” approach that, according to Cohen, “begins Chinese history in China...and 
adopts, as far as humanly possible, internal (Chinese) rather than external (Western) criteria for 
determining what is historically significant in the Chinese past.”  Perhaps the legacy of the 101











The Little Red Book in Parody and Satire 
 
Chairman Mao is not the only leader of Communist China: there is also President Liu, head of 
state, and here at last he is able to speak for himself. As the Chairman has said: ‘Let a hundred 
flowers blossom!’  102
— Quotations from President Liu Shao-C’hi, 1968. 
 
Across the Pacific, Western, and particularly American writers were working to 
reinterpret the words, tone, and structure of the Quotations to both serious and humorous effect. 
Parodists and satirists popularly used the structure and image of the Quotations as a vehicle for 
their judgements of both Chinese and American society: as a tome of stupidity for lampooning 
politicians and other controversial public figures, as a vehicle for humor, social awareness, and 
education, and as a frame of reference for familiarizing the Quotations’ visual identity and 
textual significance for American audiences.  
The quote above is taken from Quotations from President Liu Shao-C’hi, a Western 
parody of the original Quotations published in Melbourne and distributed in the United Kingdom 
and United States in 1968, one year before the aforementioned Chinese Communist Party 
statesman Liu Shao-Ch’i, more properly referred to as Liu Shaoqi, fell out of Mao Zedong’s 
 Quotations from President Liu Shao-C’hi (Melbourne: Paul Flesch & Co., 1968). 102
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favor and died in prison after allegedly receiving “harsh treatment.”  The editors intentionally 103
chose to make the vinyl cover of Quotations from President Liu bright yellow as opposed to red, 
noting the greater irony that “yellow was also the color of old Imperial China.”  By drawing 104
visual parallels between representations of “old” and “new” China, the authors of Quotations 
from President Liu implied that there was little difference between the then-present regime that 
was allegedly trying to throw off its imperial, “despotic” past.  
The Hong Kong-based Chih Luen Press, a group of “distinguished Chinese scholars,” had 
compiled and translated the quotes in 1966, during the brief period when Liu was at the zenith of 
his power and influence. By the time the book was to be published the circumstances around Liu 
were extremely unclear. The publishers, however, were acutely aware of the rift that had 
previously formed between Liu and Mao and the public shaming rituals that had been inflicted 
on Liu by Mao’s most ardent supporters, and acknowledged as such.  In the Publisher’s 105
Foreword, the anonymous publishers insisted that publishing their “little yellow book” was done 
“for purely objective reasons...Still less do we desire to take sides in the family quarrel that keeps 
the Chinese Communist household in turmoil.”  Such a description may give the impression 106
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that these scholars were behaving as bemused bystanders watching the drama unfold. In contrast, 
C.P. Fitzgerald, Australian sinologist, took a more academic tone in addressing the purpose of 
Quotations from Chairman Liu in the book’s introduction immediately following the foreword. 
“The Western reader, for whom this translation has been prepared,” he wrote, “will be able to 
form his own judgement on the nature and character of the dispute within the Chinese 
Communist movement.”  Indeed, as Fitzgerald stated, understanding was ultimately left to the 107
reader. Western readers of the original Quotations would need to put their respective talents to 
work in order to express their unique “judgements.”  
Although it is not explicitly stated that Quotations of President Liu was a parody of the 
Little Red Book, there is an undercurrent of dark humor that runs through the entire volume. 
Following the compilation of quotes sorted by subject-based chapters (the title of one chapter 
being “Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Have Made Mistakes,” the last being a dangerous 
observation that was at least partly responsible for Liu’s fall from grace) is a biography of Liu 
and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The former is drawn entirely from 
information from “Chinese Communist sources,” while the latter emphasizes articles within the 
federal document regarding citizen rights and government autonomy while omitting 
“inconsequential” parts of the Constitution “for present purposes.”  The publishers of 108
Chairman Liu present an unbalanced sort of hypocrisy that emerged from Chinese censorship, 
which also helped to quantify Western world views of China as an unstable dictatorship teetering 
on the brink of collapse. 
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Chairman Liu is one example of a contemporaneous Western parody, and one created 
outside of the United States. This chapter will focus on several pieces published in the U.S. 
between 1967 to 1979, all of them drawing some degree of inspiration from their Chinese source:  
visual, organizational, or both. Unlike the authors and translators of Chairman Liu, the American 
parodists were often not scholars by name, but were united in some understanding or desire to 
educate and entertain their readers on the state of American society. These writers took advantage 
of the versatility of the Quotations and poured their beliefs, frustrations, and desires into their 
work. The books that will be reviewed, in the order that they will appear in this chapter, are 
Quotations from Chairman LBJ by Jack Shepherd and Christopher Wren, a compilation of 
parodic quotes from then-president Lyndon B. Johnson; Quotations from Chairman Bill by 
David Franke, a similarly structured book of quotes from conservative activist William F. 
Buckley Jr.; and Quotations from Chairman Jesus by David Kirk, a revolutionary text 
restructuring quotes from the Bible through a pro-community service lens. Although each of 
these books came from different backgrounds and were intended for vastly different agendas, 
they share a number of stylistic similarities that will be discussed later in further detail. 
 
Henry Luce and Shifting American Perceptions of China 
In order to understand the Quotations’ place within American media, it is vital to 
understand where images of China in American news media were first popularized. This history 
can be traced back to the early 1930s and to the efforts of magazine magnate Henry R. Luce, the 
co-founder of Time Inc., publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines. Luce grew up in China 
as the son of American missionaries and, distilled from their religious philosophy, was a fervent 
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believer of American exceptionalism. The United States, he wrote in his infamous essay “The 
American Century,” was unique above all other nations — in fact, such traits as “a love of 
freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, [and] a tradition of self-reliance and 
independence” were traits that were uniquely and inherently American.  A shrewd 109
businessman, Luce was determined to bring his message of American exceptionalism to the 
entire United States and realize American values in the rest of the world.  China, Luce’s 110
beloved childhood homeland, was to be one of his, and Time Inc.’s, most popular targets.  
The thirties and forties saw much positive imagery of China and the Chinese government 
circulating within the United States. The reasons were many, with one of the most prominent 
being Time, Fortune, and Life’s rapidly growing circulation boosting the image of China as an 
extension of American hegemony. Life alone saw circulation grow from 360,000 in 1923 to over 
1 million in 1936.  Encouraged by the Christian faith and pro-American stance of Nationalist 111
Party leader (Kuomintang or KMT) Chiang Kai-Shek and his American-educated, devoutly 
religious wife Soong Mei-Ling, Luce took a pro-Chiang stance through his publications.  In 112
disseminating his pro-Chiang ideology, Luce also encouraged a pro-China stance through the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1936-45, praising the “know-how and morale” of the Chinese army in 
their fight against the Japanese forces. Even the Mao-led Communist forces, temporarily allied 
with the KMT against the Japanese, also received a limited amount of positive commendation. 
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“Sharing the gospel” in China was of utmost importance to Luce, so much that in a speech at a 
pro-China service in New York City, he exclaimed, “China challenges our Christian faith...and if 
we fail there, we fail totally.”  In Luce’s eyes, the fates of China and the United States had 113
become intertwined. 
 Luce’s efforts proved pivotal during the post-war period. His magazines’ widespread 
circulation (and in particular, Life’s focus on photojournalism) meant that millions were exposed 
to vivid imagery of Chinese people and places, often for the first time. Along with radio and 
newsreel, Luce’s magazines were responsible for shaping first impressions of China for countless 
Americans. However, as American ideals of China shifted over time, imagery of China within 
American media changed as well. Resurgence of civil war within China, lack of support from the 
Truman administration in supporting the ailing Nationalists, and the subsequent Communist 
victory would see the collapse of Luce’s grand vision and increasingly negative media portrayal 
of the newly Communist — and strongly atheist — People’s Republic. This negativity, 
constantly embodied in visual depictions of China’s new leader, would shape American 
understandings of China well into the latter half of the 20th century. 
 If Chiang was the failed messiah, then Mao Zedong was the usurper, the sinister leader of 
a new “Red China” long lost to the United States or its Christian philosophy. The Chinese 
Communist Party’s ideological divide with the United States translated itself into increasingly 
negative imagery of America’s former ally. In Time magazine alone, Mao appeared on 12 covers 
between 1950 and 1980; Chiang, in comparison, had appeared 8 times between 1931 and 1949. 
Often shown as an enigmatic, leering figure by cover artists, Mao’s image was often captioned 
 Ibid, 15. 113
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with heavily slanted vocabulary pertaining to his decisions: “warlord,” “chaos,” “tyranny.” A 
1958 cover featuring an unflattering, grim-faced countenance of Mao was emblazoned with a 
ominously modified quote from Napoleon: “Let China sleep. For when she awakens, the world 
will be sorry.”  Other publications describing Chinese citizens were no less forgiving; under the 114
pen of journalists and politicians alike, individuals coalesced into a faceless and formless 
“human wave” of “uniformed robots,” recalling racialized rhetoric from earlier decades when 
Americans feared the “yellow peril” of Chinese immigration.  By the 1940s, Time Inc.’s 115
magazines had collectively reached 3.8 million volumes in national circulation, the number 
rising slightly in later decades.  This meant that millions of American households were exposed 116
to this deeply critical imagery, often for generations. Combined with the efforts of other new 
media sources that adopted Time Inc.’s stances towards the People’s Republic, these 
representations would evolve into the mainstream mindset that was carried into the sixties and 
seventies and used to group Chinese works like the Quotations under the ‘Red China’ umbrella, 
as well as American works that used the Quotations as inspiration. 
 
Quotations from Chairman LBJ 
 Quotations from Chairman LBJ is arguably the most famous of the examples given in this 
chapter, as it attracted considerable media attention at the time of its release. It was produced by 
Look magazine editors Jack Shepherd and Christopher S. Wren and published by Simon and 
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Schuster in 1968, in both the midst of the Cultural Revolution in China and the United States’ 
embroilment in the Vietnam War. Both young journalists and editors at the time of publication, 
Shepherd (1937-present) and Wren (1936-present) were international correspondents for multiple 
prominent publications of the period. Shepherd focused primarily on sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East, while Wren traveled traveled through much of Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, 
and was posted at one point in the The New York Times bureau of Beijing; both would become 
lecturers and Dartmouth professors later in life.  117
As evidenced from the title, the target of Shepherd and Wren’s work was then-president 
Lyndon B. Johnson, who at the time was facing considerable criticism for the rising costs and 
American casualties of the Vietnam War.  Not only did Shepherd and Wren attempt to draw 118
visual parallels between Chairman LBJ and the Quotations, but they also made an effort to craft 
a persona of President Johnson that greatly resembled the American image of Mao. By depicting 
Johnson as a ridiculous and irrational caricature through the appropriation of Chinese 
Communist literature, Americans could draw connections to a real-life political figure. As such, 
Chairman LBJ reflected both how Americans carried previous perceptions of Mao from news 
media (Henry Luce’s magazines, for example) and how thinly veiled political satire continued to 
qualify these perceptions. Shepherd and Wren, as both journalists and American citizens, were 
not exempt from this phenomenon.  
 Christopher S. Wren, Simon and Schuster, http://www.simonandschuster.com/authors/Christopher-S-Wren/8356; 117
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The correlation between Quotations from Chairman LBJ and Quotations from Chairman 
Mao are visually obvious — both are small, palm-sized, and bright red. A modified photograph 
of Lyndon B. Johnson wearing a “Mao suit” (or Zhongshan suit, commonly worn by Chinese 
men including Mao during this period) is placed on the cover, creating a physical parallel 
between the American president and most Chinese politicians of the day who wore the same 
uniform.  The cover page attributes a quote to “Chairman Johnson”: “Don’t spit in the soup. 119
We’ve all got to eat.” The quote is strikingly collectivist, perhaps a parallel to Mao’s Communist 
ideology. Further examination of the first pages of Quotations from Chairman LBJ (henceforth 
referred to Chairman LBJ for conciseness) reveals a deliberate attempt to replicate the stilted 
English of the Beijing Foreign Languages Press translation of the Quotations, if in a rather 
overblown manner. The introduction by the “translators,” not editors, reads as follows: 
 
These quotations have been taken from speeches, musings, and digressions of Lyndon 
Baines Johnson. Their date and source are noted for reference. No effort has been made 
to rework these heroic thoughts into grammatical English. Let workers, peasants, 
students, housewives and Republicans study, memorize and digest the exhortations of 
Chairman Johnson. Let little children add their tiny voices to public and private 
recitations of these joyous inspirations.  120 
To compare, below is a portion of the foreword to the original Quotations as written by 
Lin Biao. Note that the pseudo-Marxist language and imagery of citizens of all backgrounds 
uniting under a powerful, intellectually forward leader is largely similar: 
 
The broad masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers and the broad ranks of the 
revolutionary cadres and the intellectuals should really master Mao Tse-tung's thought; 
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they should all study Chairman Mao's writings, follow his teachings, act according to his 
instructions and be his good fighters.  121  
In these words, Shepherd and Wren create parodies of themselves as lackeys of Johnson, 
encouraging Americans to lend credence to Johnson’s words as they believed the Chinese did 
Mao. However, the parallel equivalent to Lin Biao was not represented only by the personas of 
Shepherd and Wren, but also by a quote from then-presidential aide Jack Valenti who 
proclaimed, “I sleep each night a little better, a little more confidently, because Lyndon Johnson 
is my president.”  Valenti was represented as a lackey of the book’s subject, much as Lin was 122
for Mao, and was notorious for his unfettered devotion to Johnson. His quote was placed before 
the table of contents, roughly where Lin Biao’s foreword had been located in early editions of the 
Quotations. Not only was Johnson Mao, but the people around him were shaped into members of 
Mao’s inner circle.  
Many chapters within (the book numbering roughly 190 pages, 100 less than the 
Quotations) were labeled with humorous yet macabre titles like “Glorious Democratic Party,” 
“Unworthy Other Party,” “Benign Despotism,” and “White Man’s Burden.” One chapter, 
“Humility and Self-Criticism,” was marked by a single blank page, pinning Johnson as a man 
who apparently lacked either virtue.  Certain titles were copied directly from the Quotations or 123
from Mao’s most famous quotes. For example, “Let a Hundred Flowers Flourish” compiled 
quotes regarding Johnson’s self-contradictory beliefs regarding disagreement and dissent. “Let a 
 Lin Biao, Foreword, Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Second Edition), Lin Biao Internet Archive, 2002, 121
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Hundred Flowers Flourish” refers to both a line from the Quotations and a Chinese cultural 
movement in 1956 where Mao and the CCP encouraged open expression regarding the 
Communist regime. The “Hundred Flowers Campaign” (Baihua yundong) ended with the sudden 
crackdown of so-called “anti-rightists” and other intellectuals allegedly opposing the regime. 
This irony was not lost on Shepherd and Wren, who drew similarities between Mao and Johnson 
with out-of-context quotes from the latter, including “I haven’t come here tonight to say anything 
ugly about my opponent [Barry Goldwater], do any muckraking, talk about anybody,” and 
“There is a limit to how much [criticism] you want, and there is a ceiling on how much is good 
for you.”  The careful structuring of these quotes were evidently meant to paint Johnson as an 124
authoritarian, an incompetent leader, and a bumbling hypocrite.  
1968 marked both the last full year of Johnson’s term and the American presidential 
elections, which, as previously stated, correlated with the release of Chairman LBJ. It also 
marked the infamous Tet Offensive, when North Vietnamese forces launched a brutal surprise 
attack against the South Vietnamese forces and their American allies on the Vietnamese New 
Year. The attack was a significant turning point of the Vietnam War that left many Americans 
stunned and doubtful of an American victory, shifting public support away from the war and 
Johnson. The discontent around “Lyndon Johnson’s War” may have been what spurred Shepherd 
and Wren’s comparison of the president with Mao, the latter having already received 
significantly negative media attention in the United States. 
The book itself received significant media attention, with many newspapers immediately 
noting its similarity to the Quotations which had come into the American consciousness one year 
 Ibid, 109-110, 121.124
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before. The Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times observed that the book had become 
popular among Johnson’s “key aids,” one even snatching a copy out of a reporter’s hands, and 
suggested that “just about everyone around the White House, it seems, wants to get hold of it.”  125
A similar article in the Boston Globe alleged that Chairman LBJ had even reached the 
president’s attention; Johnson’s unofficial response was that he “would just as soon forget about 
it.”  These newspapers, including a multitude of others like The New York Times and the 126
Washington-based, conservative Human Events, printed lists of sample (often the most jarring or 
outrageous) quotations drawn from Chairman LBJ under their respective chapter headings.    127
There are evident similarities between these lists of Johnson quotes printed in nationally 
circulated newspapers and the Mao quotes published in the state-run People’s Liberation Army 
Daily and similar Chinese newspapers years earlier. In some manner, this is proof that Shepherd 
and Wren had accomplished their goal: to recreate Johnson in Mao’s image, and appropriate the 
language, style, and messages of the Quotations to lampoon and ultimately criticize the 
demeanor and decisions of a prominent political figure in American society. 
 
Quotations from Chairman Bill 
 Quotations from Chairman Bill (henceforth referred to as Chairman Bill) was published 
in 1970, two years after Chairman LBJ. Compiled and edited by David Franke (1935-present), 
Chairman Bill was a substantial collection of quotes from William F. Buckley Jr. (1925-2008), 
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famous conservative commentator, columnist, and author, ranging from the brutally honest to the 
witty and humorous. The founder of National Review magazine, Buckley was one of the leading 
conservatives in the United States during the twentieth century and a prolific writer. In his 
introductory notes, Franke noted that he had drawn quotes from Buckley’s “books, nearly 15 
years of [his] National Review, his syndicated newspaper column, “On the Right,” and his 
occasional articles, speeches, and lectures,” and gave personal thanks to “Bill Buckley” for 
granting him access to the appropriate material.  Although it neither makes explicit reference to 128
Mao’s Quotations nor satirizes its subject like in Chairman LBJ (at least, not in a negative 
manner), the name, structure, and choice of language used in Chairman Bill point to the strong 
possibility that it simultaneously parodies the original Quotations and pokes gentle fun at a 
fondly admired subject.  
 Franke, much like Shepherd and Wren, was a young reporter, writer, and editor during the 
time of publication. Unlike them, his activism waned and his political conservatism began 
forming in the early 1960s, with Franke writing years later that “my disillusionment in 1964 and 
afterwards was enough to cure me of any further crusading.”  Buckley, an older patron of the 129
conservative movement, was very likely a man Franke greatly admired. However, little 
explanation, whether within Chairman Bill or in retrospect, is given as to why Franke chose to 
base the name of his book after that of a Communist political leader. Multiple theories may be 
given, with none that can be fully substantiated; perhaps it was given the name simply because of 
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the Quotations’ widespread fame, or was borne out of a desire to rival the Quotations with 
something more attractive to the American conservative movement. In any case, what can 
definitely be substantiated is that by 1970, the Quotations had become iconic enough in 
American society that its name could be borrowed for a variety of usages, and understood widely 
enough that Americans could determine the nature of its contents. 
 Chairman Bill proves to be substantially different from Chairman LBJ, with the most 
evident example being that it has a different organizational structure than the original 
Quotations. While these books are fundamentally similar in that they are organized collections of 
quotes from one man, Chairman Bill lacks the chapter structure of the previous examples. 
Instead it is organized alphabetically, with each subtopic (“Cold War,” “Collectivism,” and 
“College Administrations,” for example) nested under individual letters. The overwhelming 
majority of the quotes appear to be opinion-based, reflecting Buckley’s personal thoughts, quips, 
and witticisms regarding life, the United States, religion, liberalism, and a number of named 
individuals who he, more often than not, denigrated. Although Buckley disparaged Communism 
in great detail throughout the given quotes, there is no mention of Mao or Maoism given in 
Chairman Bill. 
Being that it is a conservatively oriented work, it is unsurprising that subsequent reviews 
of Chairman Bill did not mention the influence from Mao or the Quotations. In fact, reviewers 
did not appear to interpret the book as satirical. F.S. Meyer described Chairman Bill as “the 
conservative’s vade mecum (handbook),” praising it as a “feast of Buckley for the 
connoisseur.”  If Meyer’s observation rings true, it contributes to the possibility that the book 130
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was created as a direct rival to the pro-leftist and pro-revolutionary intents of the Quotations. (It 
should be noted that this article was published in Buckley’s own magazine, National Review.) 
Carol S. Straub’s review also lauded the book as “a must for every library,” taking time to note 
that “the quotes are not in chronological order but are arranged by subject.”  Breaking down 131
long and complicated bodies of work into small, digestible “doses” of material was a hallmark 
for the Quotations, as it was for Chairman Bill. Ironically, American conservatives were learning 
from Mao. 
 Unlike Chairman LBJ, Chairman Bill seems to have been intended to promote, rather 
than denigrate, its subject. In such a case, it may be more appropriate to compare it directly with 
the Quotations, which at its core was intended to elevate and publicize Mao and his word. It can 
definitively be described as a parody — there is an undercurrent of lightheartedness that 
underscores the quotes that Franke chose — for, in some manner, Buckley is placed into Mao’s 
position as the leader of American conservatism. Chairman Bill may indeed have been intended 
as a “bible” for conservatives of the period, Buckley’s “most” significant quotes able to be 
accessed and read at a moment’s notice.  
 
Quotations from Chairman Jesus 
 Quotations from Chairman Jesus was published in 1969 and became deeply politically 
charged through its title alone, labeled as a “revolutionary bestseller” soon after its release. 
However, it differs from the previous two examples in that it is a work that appeared to have 
been meant to promote social change, rather than deride or elevate the “chairman” in question. 
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(As per the previous examples, Quotations from Chairman Jesus will be shortened to Chairman 
Jesus when mentioned.) The deeply serious tone of the works suggests that Chairman Jesus was 
not a parody of the Quotations in the humorous or comical sense; instead, it may be interpreted 
as a satire of the Bible, whose scathing messages were combined with and morphed into the 
distinctive, recognizable structure of the Quotations. 
 As may be ascertained from the title, Jesus Christ is placed in the position of Mao, 
perhaps marking Mao as China’s “god,” and the quotes within are drawn from the Bible. The 
almost-blasphemous juxtaposition was intentional — the quotes were compiled by civil rights 
and anti-poverty activist Father David Kirk (1935-2007), founder of the Harlem-based Emmaus 
House and a self-described radical. A Roman Catholic convert originally from Mississippi, Kirk 
was trained as a young man under Dorothy Day, one of the founders of the Catholic Worker 
Movement. Organized as a series of semi-connected houses and institutions across the United 
States, the Catholic Worker Movement was “committed to nonviolence, voluntary poverty, and 
the Works of Mercy.”  Emmaus House was no exception to the guideline; Kirk himself 132
described it as a “stepchild” to the movement. Still in operation today, it was intended as a 
Christian community center open to all individuals, regardless of background, race, or faith (a 
number of non-Catholics were known to have attended Sunday evening mass).   133
Chairman Jesus, too, evoked Kirk’s pro-revolutionary, pro-community stance on 
Christianity. Along with being a place of worship and hospitality, Emmaus also hosted guest 
speakers on Christianity and politics, and Kirk’s office held stores of literature and pamphlets 
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that “championed a variety of radical religious and political causes.”  Kirk argued vehemently 134
several major points: that religion and politics could not be mutually exclusive; that revolution, 
defined by him as historically having involved both spiritual and physical civil disobedience and 
violence on the part of Christ, was a necessity for church reform; and that revolution was 
ingrained deeply into Christianity from its historical beginnings. “Praying,” he remarked, “after 
all, is a form of picketing.”   135
With the dissemination of the Quotations in the United States during the late 1960s, Kirk 
would have had a template on which to impress his pro-revolutionary agenda. Father John 
Garvey, who assisted Kirk with compiling quotes, remarked years later that the title of Chairman 
Jesus had indeed been inspired by the radical furor of the late 1960s, “when Mao’s little Red 
Book was all the rage with campus radicals.”  If the Quotations was the so-called “bible” of the 136
Chinese masses, Chairman Jesus was an augmented version of the English-language Bible 
meant to communicate a radical version of Christianity to the American masses.  
Internally, Chairman Jesus is organized by theme, with subthemes (for example:” Jesus 
was Tempted to be Fully Political” under “Jesus and Revolution”) under each and occasional 
analyses of certain biblical quotations. Examples include “The New Age” and “Jesus’s Style in 
Revolution: The Suffering Servant.” The final section is of particular interest, including a 
disclaimer from the editors arguing that the early Christian church was “communist in the 
broadest sense; Christians...owned all things in common…[and] were absolutely non-violent and 
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 Ibid, 64.135
 John Garvey, “Remembering Fr. David Kirk,” In Communion, August 5, 2007, https://incommunion.org/136
2007/08/05/remembering-fr-david-kirk/.
 66
opposed to any war.”  The insertion of religious faith into Communism, which as a historical 137
political practice was often decidedly atheist in nature, is particular to Kirk’s argument. However, 
his argument was not to make the revolution itself Christian. Kirk made certain to separate yet 
weave together certain aspects of revolution and religion, for in a preceding chapter of Chairman 
Jesus he wrote: 
 
There is never a ‘Christian revolution.’ Our task is not to set up Christian states or 
societies, but to humanize the secular order, or the revolution. The coming of the 
Kingdom confronts Christianity and society with the dynamic principle of a society 
always reforming. If revolution means ‘change of relationships,’ ‘new life,’ ‘new men,’ 
etc., these are clearly Christian concepts.  138 
As can be ascertained from the evidence above, Kirk understood the Quotations as a 
template for revolution and impressed his personal agenda by reshaping and adding onto its 
structure to suit his arguments. Unlike Chairman LBJ or Chairman Bill, Chairman Jesus is 
presented as a deeply serious text as well as a modernized literary analysis of religious scripture. 
In some sense, it is incendiary like the Quotations, presenting a call for community engagement 
and action through a Maoist lens. The last page of Chairman Jesus supports this notion — the 
final line is “THE BREAD IS RISING!,” both the name of Emmaus House’s published journal 
and an alleged code word used by rebels of the 1789 French Revolution.   139
 
 





The social unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s provided fertile ground for writers and 
satirists seeking to explain or capitalize upon the sociopolitical upheaval of American society. 
The Quotations, with its Chinese Communist origins, unique visual form, recognizable writing 
style, and chapter organization, was a popular source of inspiration for Americans of varying 
political beliefs, providing them with the means to publish their thoughts in a format 
contemporaneously relevant to what their audience had seen and read from the news.  
The original message of the Quotations did not always matter to American writers, who 
removed or replaced it as needed in their books. Although the Little Red Book’s message was 
undeniably radical and was thus borrowed for “revolutionary” texts like Chairman Jesus, it was 
also appropriated, ironically or not, for books spanning the political spectrum from left-leaning 
(Chairman LBJ), to right-wing (Chairman Bill), copying the chapter-by-theme style to various 
degrees of accuracy. What truly ties the three parodies and satires to their original source is such: 
each removed quotes from their original context, with the likelihood that the original meaning 
was changed in the process, and structured them in a manner that suited their respective agenda. 
The Quotations was a versatile enough blueprint to parody powerful men, praise other powerful 
men, or even to remind readers of a higher power. In this manner, these parodies and satires can 
be compared directly to the Quotations, which had been formed through the careful compilation 
and organization of hundreds of scattered quotes. The “Mao” that was created through this 
juxtaposition of quotes was not the man himself, but the character that the Quotations’ publishers 
wished for readers to see; the same concept applies to the aforementioned parodies, all of which 
created caricatures, both respectable and ridiculous, of their subjects. 
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Finally, it is telling that out of the three given examples, Chairman LBJ was the most 
popular and received the most mainstream media attention. Comparing politicians, CEOs, and 
other men of influence to the created caricature of “Chairman Mao” rapidly became a common 
way to denigrate them as self-important and otherwise absurd. Over the ensuing decades, the 
correlation between the Quotations and overblown political dogmatism gradually became 
synonymous in American popular media, and has been a widely held association that persists to 



















Chapter Three  
The Little Red Book, The Cult of Mao, and American Arts and Culture  
 
“Is great pleasure to have sexual congress according to Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung theory 
for procreation of right-thinking offspring only!”  140
— Bill Griffith and Jay Kinney, Red Guard Romance, 1977 
 
Origins of the Little Red Book in American News Media 
Despite the Quotations’ status as an ideologically subversive text from a Communist 
nation, both its image and contents eventually seeped into the attentions of American artistic and 
literary culture. Through the Quotations, media creators could look “inwards” and “outwards” 
towards China under Mao, comparing the state of China to the state of the U.S. and, perhaps, cast 
greater judgment upon humanity itself. However, the need to critically interpret the contents of 
the Quotations was often waylaid in favor of studying the book as not simply a text, but a 
cultural object. The Quotations was visualized as a bombastic political work symbolic of the 
ideology it represented, an ideology so foreign and so unusual that it could become a source of 
entertainment in American eyes. Alongside fabricating their own understandings, media creators 
provided a layer of critical interpretation (and obfuscation) for their Cold War-era American 
audience. 
 Bill Griffith and Jay Kinney, “Red Guard Romance,” Young Lust (San Francisco: Company and Sons, 1977), 1. 140
This is the opening dialogue from the comic, part of a series parodying romantic comic books from prominent 
publishers DC and Marvel. “Red Guard Romance” is a pornographic work that utilizes imagery of the Little Red 
Book to satirize the dogmatic devotion of the Red Guards.  
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On October 13th, 1966, The Hartford Times in Hartford, Connecticut published “The 
New Religion” by resident political cartoonist and Pulitzer Prize winner Edmund Valtman. The 
cartoon depicts a massive procession of identically dressed Chinese civilians, supporting an 
enormous, Buddha-like caricature of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong on a 
sedan chair. The parade is led by Marshal Lin Biao in full uniform, hands folded and eyes 
lowered in prayer, flanked by men and women reciting from small, palm-sized books labeled 
“Mao’s Thought.”   The “Mao’s Thought” books depict one of the earliest appearances of the 141
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (henceforth known as the Quotations, or nicknamed 
the “Little Red Book”) in American news media. By portraying the cult of personality Mao had 
built during his years in power as China’s newly adopted religion, Valtman’s cartoon takes on a 
sardonic mocking quality towards the Communist regime.  
Valtman went on to continue satirizing Mao during his nearly twenty year tenure at The 
Hartford Times.  During that time period, his work was reproduced in several major 142
newspapers around the country, such as The New York Times. He was, however, not the only 
media creator during the sixties and seventies to use the Quotations as a symbol of Mao’s 
expansive political influence. Although the Quotations was no book club favorite in mainstream, 
non-politically inclined America, the book became a source of bemusement to American media 
creators — artists, writers, and other individuals who produced media content during the period 
— and the audiences who subsequently gleaned their own understandings and 
misunderstandings.  
 Edmund Valtman, “The New Religion,” The Hartford Times (October 13, 1966), Library of Congress, Prints and 141
Photographs Division. For the comic, see Appendix 1.
 “Connecticut Guide,” The New York Times, May 13 1990. 142
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However, it would be wrong to assume that artists were solely lampooning the 
Quotations for entertainment’s sake. There were multiple reasons as to why the book struck a 
chord among Americans across a wide swathe of backgrounds and beliefs, particularly between 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the mid-century decades of Cold War discontent and debate, 
the Quotations was a work that gradually became familiar among the politically aware viewers 
of American news media, one that stirred emotion among both sympathizers and detractors of 
Maoist ideology. In other words, Americans were increasingly likely to have seen or heard of the 
book via magazines, newspaper, and TV. Thus, the Quotations, paired with its association with 
the notorious Chairman Mao, simultaneously carried a political and “pop” cultural gravitas. 
Recasting the Quotations as not merely a political statement, but also as a work of art, proved to 
be fertile ground for further artistic or literary interpretation. In the struggle to better portray the 
conflicted world around them for an equally conflicted audience, artists and literary greats used 
the Quotations as a template. 
The following sections will elaborate on the appearance and underlying significance of 
the Quotations as an inspiration for art. The two examples are the Mao-based works of Edward 
Albee and Andy Warhol, both esteemed artists (a playwright and Pop artist, respectively) who 
were themselves American citizens both aware of the implications and their own interpretations 
of the Quotations, yet vulnerable to outside media influence. The section on Albee focuses on 
Albee’s 1968 play Box-Mao, which premiered a year after the Quotations was released in the 
United States. The section on Warhol analyzes two of Warhol’s art series: the Mao silkscreens of 
the early 1970s and the Little Red Book polaroid series of the same period. Albee’s and Warhol’s 
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works were significant not only in the usage of the Quotations  as a source, but the greater 
context of Mao, China, and contemporary geopolitical struggles.  
 
Box-Mao 
 In the fall of 1968, Box and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung or Box-Mao 
opened at the Billy Rose Theatre in Manhattan after a debut several months earlier at a Buffalo 
arts festival.  The play was written and produced by Edward Albee, acclaimed American 143
dramatist who had received a Tony Award for Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? in 1963, as well as 
a Tony and a Pulitzer Prize for A Delicate Balance in 1967. At the time of the premiere, Albee 
was a well-known yet “moderately young pretender” in the world of theater, his style already 
unorthodox with the times.  A fiercely outspoken liberal in his later years, Albee’s politically 144
‘experimental’ work would prove divisive among the critics who were among the audience on 
Box-Mao’s opening night. 
 Albee released Box-Mao in 1968, a year of great unease in both American and foreign 
politics. On the domestic front, negative opinion of the Vietnam War escalated with the 
unexpected Tet Offensive and media-recorded brutality of the My Lai Massacre; civil rights 
demonstrations and the continued proliferation of political radicalism fueled further discontent in 
the 1968 presidential elections. Within China, Mao’s power had been consolidated by the 
widespread destruction of old Chinese customs, culture, ideas, and habits by the Red Guards in 
the final stages of the Cultural Revolution. The fanatical student movement, after beginning to 
 Clive Barnes, “Theater: Albee's Adventurous Plays: 'Box' and 'Quotations of Chairman Mao' Open,” The New 143
York Times, October 1st, 1968. 
 Ibid.144
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turn to factional infighting, was personally disbanded by Mao in June of the same year. In 
October, the same month Box-Mao opened on Broadway, Mao and his most adamant followers 
were purging both the Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army leadership of possible 
dissenters, including Mao’s would-be successor Liu Shaoqi.  Albee’s previous plays had been 145
subtly political at most; it is thus significant that he chose to publish Box-Mao at such a restless 
time in history. Despite attempts by critics to skim over the politically charged aspects of the 
work, Box-Mao must be regarded for what it is — an affirmation, if not a response, to the 
relevance of both domestic and global conflict using a political divisive work as a source.  
Albee’s choices in using the Quotations to write Box-Mao, along with the cautiously 
positive yet tentatively critical connotations picked up by reviewers, may have also tied into the 
playwright’s leftist sentiments.  While it is impossible to pin down exactly when and where he 146
came in contact with the Quotations, it may be likely that he encountered Communist literature 
before or during his most productive decades in the 60s and 70s, corresponding with his most 
fervent experimentations with abstraction and the release of Box-Mao. Albee’s political 
expression through his theatrical work was often nuanced, carrying no explicit political meaning; 
Box-Mao, drawing both source and inspiration from a blatantly Communist work, was the first of 
its kind in his repertoire. Albee had had a vested interest in exploring complicated, disconcerting 
situations through his plays. This work could scandalize his audience — as he described it, “I 
want the audience to run out of the theater… but come back and see the play again.”  Although 147
 “Intelligence Report: Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ III. The Purge of the P.L.A. and the Stardom of Madame 145
Mao,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1968.
 Gazelle Imami, “Who’s Afraid of Edward Albee?,” The Huffington Post, September 27, 2014. 146
 Arthur Gelb,“Dramatists Deny Nihilistic Trend: Gelber (The Connection'), Albee ('The Zoo Story') Explain Their 147
Views,” The New York Times, February 15, 1960.
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the Quotations was still a fairly recent phenomenon in the United States in 1968, there is reason 
to believe that it fit neatly into Albee’s interests.  
 A heavily abstracted piece of limited casting size and minimal prop usage, Box-Mao 
consisted of two separate yet intertwining plays: “Box” and “Quotations from Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung.” “Box” had been produced before “Mao”; after its initial rejection by Broadway 
director Chuck Gnys, who described Box’s unorthodox style as “boring and pointless,” Mao was 
added.  Box-Mao became the unusual juxtaposition of an actor dressed up as Mao reciting 148
selected quotes from the Little Red Book, the rambling, melancholy narrative of a well-to-do 
“average” American woman, “Over the Hill to the Poorhouse” by Will Carlton recited by a poor 
elderly woman, and a recorded feminine voice emitting from the eponymous box sitting on the 
stage. Otherwise, Box-Mao contains no discernable narrative, with all dialogues performed 
simultaneously. Many of the actors are seemingly aware of the audience, spending most of their 
time immobile on stage, and yet (as emphasized in the stage directions) remain unaware of the 
others. From beginning to end, about an hour overall, the show remains static. The characters 
barely move from their starting positions, and there is little advancement, if any at all, in their 
respective stories.  
 The work itself is left open to interpretation, as Albee gives no official explanation. 
Performed simultaneously with “Box”, “Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung” takes on 
multiple meanings, often depending on one’s own political leanings. For a viewer more 
sympathetic to the Chinese Communist regime, Box-Mao seems to contrast the legitimate 
concerns of imperialism’s effects on the international community with the frivolous personal 
 Mel Gussow, Edward Albee: A Singular Journey (Milwaukee: Applause Theatre and Cinema Books, 1999), 320.148
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worries of an anonymous American woman.  For one more skeptical, particularly a viewer who 
willingly accepted images of China from mainstream American news media as truthful, it 
juxtaposes the ramblings of a repressive dictator with the comparatively more wistful narrative 
of a more relatable individual. The majority of critical reaction to the play seemed to have 
overlooked the possibility of Albee’s emerging political tendencies in favor of understanding the 
play’s content.  
 Within the context of the play, Albee recreated Mao as both a representation of the actual 
chairman and as a theatrical character. Authenticity, while valued, was not essential in bringing 
Mao to life. Mao the character, as outlined in Albee’s notes, would ideally be played by “an 
oriental actor who resembles [him].” But, as Albee noted in his general comments, a non-Asian 
actor using “makeup or a face mask” was also acceptable, as proved by Pendleton’s casting.  149
Mao, in contrast to the other players of Box-Mao, is given an actual name, a manifestation of the 
real man down to the “padding to give [him] figure.”  He evokes “characteristically Chinese 150
mannerisms” in his communication with the audience, bowing and gesticulating before, after, 
and during his addresses, emphasizing his foreignness and assuring the audience that he is, 
indeed, Mao the Chinese leader.  Furthermore, he is the only character who is completely 151
aware of the audience’s presence, spending the duration of the play lecturing them “rather like a 
teacher.”  It is thus safe to assume that Albee’s careful approach to authenticity is meant for 152
 Edward Albee, Box and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Dramatists Play Service Inc., 149
1969), 4-5. 
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audience members to immediately figure out who the character is supposed to be, and interpret 
him as Mao the chairman attempting to sway their beliefs with his quotes.  
 Mao loftily walks up and down upon a raised platform above all of the other characters, 
quoting primarily pro-revolutionary and anti-imperialist lines from the Quotations. Most of his 
lines appear to have been drawn from the Quotations chapters “War and Peace,” “Imperialism 
and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers,” “Patriotism and Internationalism,” and “Dare to 
Struggle and Dare to Win,” all of which are chapters with an incendiary, revolutionary slant. 
Chapters that dealt with more theoretical topics like self-criticism, discipline, and service were 
ignored. Consider the last and incredibly provocative line in the play Mao speaks in English, 
which is drawn from “Dare to Struggle and Dare to Win”: “People of the world, unite and defeat 
the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!”  Although he primarily speaks English, he 153
occasionally speaks Quotations lines in Mandarin, the latter written phonetically in the script. As 
it is unlikely that most of the play’s viewers understood Mandarin, Albee likely meant for the 
lines to provide some degree of authenticity, as if the audience was truly listening to Mao speak. 
Mao the character paraphrases his “own” quotes, which were themselves distilled into the 
Quotations, thus offering a very narrow and American-centric insight into the work’s content. It 
is uncertain whether or not Albee presented this juxtaposition intentionally. Foreignness, thus, 
was contrived in Box-Mao, but without particular regard for authenticity, reflecting American 
understandings of the tumultuous 1960s through limited news media.  
What is known is that the mannerisms of Mao the character were strongly influenced by 
media footage of Mao the person; Albee cited “documentaries, posters, and photographs” to get 
 Ibid, 38.153
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the actor into character. The actor also carried a copy of the “real” Quotations in which his lines 
were pasted over the book’s text, allowing him to read distilled lines from an already-distilled 
collection of sayings.  Later in his career, Albee would reflect on the “indirectly political” 154
essence of plays, which could impart upon their audiences subtleties that could not be well 
expressed through other media.  It is evident that he was already experimenting with more 155
blatant examples of this possibility in Box-Mao, juxtaposing the abstraction of the play with the 
political realities of Maoism.  
Albee's tactics appear to have been effective. Critics, when reviewing Box-Mao, took it 
upon themselves to review Mao the character as well, responding to his Quotations as if they 
were simply a part of the theater drama and not an actual written work appropriated by Albee. In 
his review as published in The New York Times, acclaimed theater critic Clive Barnes commented 
on the quotes lifted from the Quotations as if a potential audience might mistake them as part of 
the crafted absurdity of the play, being certain to add that “Mr. Albee wrote not a word of 
them.”  Barnes, writing as an Englishman working in the United States, evidently found the 156
Quotations’ messages too ludicrous to analyze rationally. To support this revelation, he continued 
to write, “the voices [of the play] seem to have an awful relevance...but the mood is one of 
carefully studied, haughtily urbane nonsense.” Barnes’ article comes paired with a photograph of 
the play’s opening cast in action.  Mao, as played by veteran theater performer Wyman 157
 Solomon, “Forging Text into Theatre,” 87.154
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Pendleton, wore a face-concealing mask that only tentatively resembles the real man, further 
adding to the absurdity. The choice of using a mask, rather than makeup, added yet another layer 
of separation between Mao and the overwhelmingly Western audience. 
 As Albee critic Anne Paolucci noted in 1972, “recreating” Mao disconnects him from his 
role as Chairman of the People’s Republic, and yet, the so-called attempts at authenticity 
immediately makes him recognizable to an American audience. By removing Mao from his real-
world political position and placing him in the foreign environment of the American theater 
stage, Albee transformed him from a political figure to a character to be criticized and critically 
interpreted. Words from the Quotations are, thus, repackaged into pieces of drama. His words are 
universally hopeful, but belie an “arrogant optimism” that can never truly come to fruition.  158
Albee himself confirmed the character in his best form as “factual and ironic.”  The 159
Quotations, thus, were interpreted as Mao’s true, unfiltered words, rather than the efforts of 
Mao’s aides to paraphrase them for a relatively less skeptical Chinese audience.  
A great number of other reviewers focused on grouping Box-Mao into Albee’s 
experimental works of the late 60s and early 70s, washing away any political affiliation 
altogether and distilling the play into an experimental piece — in other words, theater for 
theater’s sake. Critics struggled to define the newfound politico of Albee’s work. American 
director and drama critic Harold Clurman, when reviewing Box-Mao, described it as a 
“polyphonic chamber work.” He would continue, “[sic] Box-Mao-Box is like no other play 
 Anne Paolucci, in “Partita: Box and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung” in From Tension to Tonic: The 158
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[Albee] has written and like very few others written by anyone else.”  It is unsurprising, then, 160
that analytical summaries of Box-Mao often simply described the play with the politically neutral 
term “abstract”, when the words of the Quotations were definitively not so. Such a work was 
unprecedented in the modern American theater world.   161
Box-Mao, relative to Albee’s more famous plays, did not appear to receive mainstream 
attention during its tenure at the Billy Rose Theatre beyond observers within the theater world. 
However, its influence seems to have earned itself a place among Albee’s body of work. A notice 
on the Sun Reporter included Box-Mao in a 1978 conglomeration of Albee’s “most famous” 
short plays as performed in San Francisco’s American Conservatory Theater.  Running only 162
two years after Mao’s death, the chairman remained alive still through “his” book and “his” play, 
of which he had no ownership and yet still claimed a significant amount of attention. The 
unsettling quotes and vivid messages pulled from the Quotations had recognizable significance 
for the theater-going public.  
Although it may never be entirely certain what exactly Albee intended by reconstructing 
Mao in Box-Mao, it is evident that he was recreated as a theater character to be critically 
interpreted, someone that the audience was meant to react to in whichever way they saw fit. Yet, 
Mao stands out from his white, American cohorts through careful attention to visual 
representation, whether through clothing, weight, or mannerisms. In a performance as abstract as 
 Mel Gussow, Edward Albee, 321.160
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Box-Mao, Mao’s character was simultaneously realistic yet fantastic, obfuscating the lines 
between theater and real-life politics with his presence alone. The staunchly anti-imperialist 
rhetoric Albee assigned to Mao the character created a provocative and memorable persona that, 
while not an authentic representation by any means, was one that was firmly rooted in American 
mass media depictions of Mao the chairman. 
 
Andy Warhol, Mao, and the Red Book Albums 
As evidenced by Albee’s character portrayal, the character of Mao and the teachings of 
“his” book had become synonymous in American eyes in the late 1960s. Mao’s visual presence is 
also particularly significant when his own portrait appears as the frontispiece of all English 
editions of the Quotations. The picture itself varies from edition to edition, but most recognizable 
in American-published editions is Mao’s ubiquitous painted portrait, an annually updated 
tradition begun by portraitist Wang Guodong, which now hangs over Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing.  The chairman’s countenance has also been subject to reinterpretation by numerous 163
contemporary artists, perhaps most notably the brightly colored silkscreens made by Pop Art 
great Andy Warhol between 1971-1974, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in China and 
continued dissemination of political and social countercultures in the United States.  In his Mao 164
series, Warhol removed the chairman’s image from the Quotations and recast it as a mass-
 Faye Yan Zhang, “Portraits of Mao,” The Harvard Advocate, Fall 2014. 163
 For more information on the rise of American counterculture in the 1960s and 70s and its relationship to 164
Maoism, see Fred Ho, Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America (Oakland: 
AK Press, 2001).
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produced capitalist commodity, utilizing the ubiquity of Mao’s image, recasting it numerous 
times in unique, garish shades, and popularizing Mao for the American audience. 
Warhol’s interest in Mao seems to have stemmed from his longtime fascination with pop 
culture imagery. In the latter half of a seven year hiatus from art, which began in 1964 after 
finishing his Flowers series, Warhol searched for an appropriate human subject to continue his 
work. His idea to utilize Mao’s image allegedly first emerged from a conversation with his 
friend, the Swiss art dealer Bruno Bischofberger. After Bischofberger’s suggestion that Warhol 
portray the “most important” person of the 20th century (Bischofberger had had in mind Albert 
Einstein), the artist responded,  “I was just reading in Life magazine that the most famous person 
in the world today is Chairman Mao. Shouldn’t it be the most famous person, Bruno?”  165
It is uncertain which volume of Life Warhol had been referring to in his conversation with 
Bischofberger, although the January 20th, 1967 issue of the magazine is the most 
contemporaneous and thus the most probable source. The cover of that issue was labeled “China: 
Crisis in Mao’s Purge,” capturing a fleeting moment during the Cultural Revolution with a troop 
of male Red Guards stationed in Canton (Guangzhou). One anonymous Red Guard carries the 
ubiquitous Mao portrait, swathed with red fabric. Regarding sources like the magazine cover 
depicting Chinese devotion to Mao, Warhol would say the following with great enthusiasm: 
“I’ve been reading so much about China. They’re so nutty. They don’t believe in creativity. The 
only picture they ever have is of Mao Zedong. It’s great.”  166
 Bob Colacello, Holy Terror: Andy Warhol Close Up (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1990). 165
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Warhol’s quote reflected the image of China that he had gleaned from American media 
sources, and is significant in that the “picture” of Mao mentioned would eventually influence a 
wide swath of his most popular work, . (He would eventually visit China for himself in 1982., 
taking photos of famous Chinese landmarks and bemused Chinese citizens.)  Life was not the 167
only media source at the time where Warhol could draw inspiration; images of “Red China” were 
ubiquitous across American print media during the sixties and seventies. Warhol’s observations 
on Mao’s “cult of personality,” too, were substantiated by news media. As was common among 
mainstream, anti-communist sources of the period, Americans were casting a critical eye upon 
the ongoing Cultural Revolution, despite the uncertainty of the human toll of the movement. At 
the center of the chaos was Mao, the “sunshine that lights up China” and the center of a 
seemingly unstable movement supported by an equally unstable ideology.  It was this 168
uncertainty and resulting “irrationality” of the CCP leadership that drew the attention of 
Americans, including Warhol, towards China, and cast a skeptical light on internationally 
disseminated propagandistic sources like the Little Red Book. Mao, like “his” Quotations, was 
just as difficult to ascertain. 
Although Warhol’s series began only four years after Albee’s Box-Mao ran on Broadway, 
the two media pieces emerged in two substantially different geopolitical environments. As Albee 
had likely witnessed just years earlier, Warhol too would have been exposed to American media 
representations of “Red China.” However, Warhol had the advantage of a very different 
 The infamous image of Warhol in a Mao suit and People’s Liberation Army Cap stems from this visit. For more 167
information on his visit to China, see Christopher Makos, Andy Warhol in China: The Photographs of Christopher 
Makos (Hong Kong: Blue Kingfisher Press, 2008). 
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perspective on China in 1972 that Albee would never have experienced in 1969: A substantial 
shift in Chinese diplomatic policy, U.S. rapprochement (resumption of harmonious relations) 
with China, and President Nixon’s subsequent visit to Beijing in the same year. The mid-60s had 
marked Mao’s gradual change of heart towards relations with the United States, and the chaotic 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution pushed him to urge restraint within the Communist Party 
and reconsider his staunchly “anti-imperialist” foreign policy.  High-level political discussions 169
between Chinese and U.S. leaders during the early 1970s would begin normalizing relations 
between the former rivals.  
With Nixon’s diplomatic visit, Mao was suddenly no longer the enigmatic figure lurking 
in the dark realms of American imagination, but a tentative ally of the United States in the 
latter’s struggle against the Soviet Union. Likewise, mainstream views of China began seeing 
positive trends. The first American visitors to the People’s Republic, diplomats and civilians 
alike, returned with glowing anecdotes of (heavily regulated) tours of the once-isolated country, 
most still unaware of the Cultural Revolution’s tolls.  The Mao series thus emerged in a period 170
where old perceptions of a foreign country and its leader thoroughly clashed with new narratives. 
Warhol’s understandings, however, were mixed: they fell solidly in the former, influenced by the 
slow-to-shift mainstream media from where he drew much of his inspiration, yet contained 
essences of the latter, showing in how Warhol utilized hand-picked news imagery to recreate 
Mao as an American icon. 
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Warhol’s first version of Mao (the silkscreen), a massive, sprawling painting scrawled 
with unnatural splotches of pink and yellow, appeared in 1972.  His first executions of the Mao 171
portraits varied from poster size to over fifteen feet in height, perhaps resembling the oversized 
portrait of Mao he had seen in Life. The five portraits produced in 1972 maintained much the 
grayscale color scheme of the original photograph, but subsequent iterations, produced well into 
1973, became increasingly garish in color. The neon-colored splotches of the beginning evolved 
into more intentional coloring on Mao’s lips, eyes, and cheeks, giving the impression of the 
chairman wearing glamorous and very Western makeup. The severity of Wang Guodong’s 
portrait takes on a feminized, parodic quality.  
Mao was not Warhol’s first attempt at recreating the image of a popular celebrity, nor that 
of a prominent political figure under mass media scrutiny. After actress and model Marilyn 
Monroe’s death in 1962, Warhol produced the famous Marilyn Diptych utilizing a repeating 
silkscreen method later incorporated into the Mao series. The Jackie series from 1963-1964, 
created in the wake of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, appropriated numerous images 
of the widowed First Lady Jacqueline “Jackie” Kennedy from newspapers and magazines and 
placed them on neon-colored canvas panels.   These images were grouped by critics with 172
Warhol’s “ready-made” work of recreated Brillo boxes and Campbell’s soup cans, reflecting both 
his fascination with “mass production” aesthetic and the frustration in assigning conventional 
artistic meaning to Warhol’s atypical style. Poet and critic David Antin described Warhol’s 
agglomeration of work as “beautiful failures” — “beautiful” in their aesthetic quality, “failures” 
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in their inability to function as either art or useful object.  Fellow critic Wyston Curnow 173
qualified Antin’s argument by reflecting on the mass-produced works as part of Warhol’s 
capitalist identity, describing the emptiness of his pop culture imagery as “nonsense.”  It would 174
be an attitude that would be carried over to the Mao series, which began production only a year 
after Curnow’s analysis. 
While not the only American artist to recast Mao’s visage (fellow Pop artist Roy 
Lichtenstein had produced lithographs in 1971, also titled Mao, based off a different portrait), 
Warhol’s work was particularly striking to his audience. Warhol’s controversiality from his 
previous works also factored into their reactions, reflecting on his ability to create “hollow,” 
shallow work devoid of meaning.  Somehow, that same understanding that colored critical 175
interpretation of his paintings of Marilyn Monroe and Jackie Kennedy also translated over to 
Mao, and critics therefore often grouped his countenance in with American celebrities. Mao 
became another face in the aesthetic propagated by Warhol, a Chinese statesman who, through 
the lens of silk, paint, and mass production, becomes just as quintessentially American as 
Warhol’s other subjects. Some art exhibitors played with this notion; a 1979 Warhol-exclusive 
exhibit at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York juxtaposed three giant Mao 
silkscreens along the likes of American figures like writer Truman Capote and musician Mick 
Jagger. The Mao portraits, however, were housed in their own “special, chapel-like pavilion” of 
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the exhibition space.  Mao, along with a myriad of other international art subjects, had been 176
granted a particular spot of significance — American, but not quite enough to intermingle with 
images of American figures. 
Considering the Mao series as strictly commodifying the chairman’s image with capitalist 
notions of production, however, risks (and has created) interpretations of Warhol’s work as 
apolitical, or at least stripped of political affiliation. In a similar light to Albee’s work, some of 
Warhol’s contemporary critics attempted to draw a division between art and politics. Wrote Anne 
Rorimer in 1975, “the portrait of Mao is not based off political views or propaganda…[there are] 
no personal feelings or opinions beyond those in inherent choice of subject.”  Rorimer’s 177
analysis is grounded in Warhol’s aforementioned beliefs, but also ignores the Quotations’ 
influence, and by indirect, impersonal means, Mao’s, on his art. While it is arguable how much 
Warhol truly cared about the abstractions of geopolitical struggle — also reflected in his 
aforementioned personal statements on Chinese creativity — such an observation contrasts with 
the source material from where he found his inspiration.  
A contrasting, more politically weighted analysis of the series comes not from the United 
States, but from London’s Mayor Gallery where the Mao series was exhibited in 1974. Caroline 
Tisdall reflected on Mao’s image, in contrast to the Western-centric media saturation of Marilyn 
Monroe or Jackie (then) Kennedy, as “a changer of society.” Warhol, Tisdall argues, adopts and 
adapts “the most influential image of Maoism” and weighs it with a degree of “cynical paradox 
 Hilton Kramer, “Art: Whitney Shows Warhol Works,” The New York Times, November 23, 1979.176
 Anne Rorimer, “Andy Warhol’s Mao, 1973,” Bulletin of the Art Institute of Chicago (1973-1982) 4 (1975): 7177
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about two systems.”  Therefore, Mao can best be explained as an uneasy balance between the 178
forces of capitalism and communism. In some manner, much like Albee’s Mao, Warhol’s 
interpretation tears painting-Mao and Chairman Mao apart: one a real-life communist leader, the 
other a communist leader trapped within capitalist commodity. Warhol himself wondered about 
this juxtaposition in a stream-of-consciousness essay published in Vogue: “Would Mao like my 
Mao?”  Even without agenda or straightforward intent, Warhol’s work carries with it 179
significant political weight.  
The connection between Warhol and the Quotations strengthens with the existence of one 
of his other collections, the Little Red Book Polaroid series. As with Box-Mao, the artistic series 
will henceforth be in italics to differentiate it from the Quotations. Produced between 1970 and 
1975, the Little Red Book polaroids were created concurrently with the Mao silkscreens. While 
Warhol himself never explicitly mentioned the inspiration for the name, the existence of the Mao 
series combined with his knowledge of the world’s “most famous” man makes it most probable 
that the Quotations was the inspiration, as opposed to American sources like Redbook 
magazine.  Driven by his impulse to capture and collect images and influenced by the 180
mechanical immediacy of the camera, Warhol carried around a Polaroid to nearly all of his social 
functions, documenting them in hundreds of photos and compiling them into organized albums. 
 Caroline Tisdall, “Warhol Exhibition at the Mayor Gallery,” The Guardian, February 28, 1974.178
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Hundreds of the Little Red Book pieces still exist, each bound in a red Holson Polaroid album 
reminiscent of Foreign Language Press-produced editions of the Quotations.   181
It would again be tempting to dismiss this series as apolitical, considering the subject 
content. In complete contrast to the textual organization in the Quotations, the Little Red Books 
are, more often than not, portraits of individuals. This is in direct contrast to the Quotations, 
which, alongside featuring the portrait and sayings of one individual, was designed to submerge 
the individualism of others in favor of a collective greater good. The overwhelming majority of 
the photos’ subjects were members of Warhol’s social circle — artists, actors, models, and other 
men and women captured in informal candid photographs, both aware and unaware of the 
camera’s presence. Some contain multiple celebrities; others, like Little Red Book #133, 
showcase the life and activities of only one individual (in the case of #133, the subject was 
television personality Dick Cavett). The contrast, likely intentional, is startling; the unity and 
collectivism so emphasized in the Quotations was turned on its head in the Little Red Books, 
where American individualism and personal expression reigns.  These snapshots do not reply 182
on its subjects behaving in a certain manner, but merely capture moments of them behaving as 
themselves. However, the albums are not so much a subversion as a “translation” of the same 
genre for a different audience. Much like popular editions of the Quotations, the Little Red Books 
were pocket-sized, portable, and created in mass quantities, with the innate ability to be widely 
distributed and disseminated to a celebrity-conscious audience. Although a visual rather than 
 For examples of Warhol’s series that were eventually granted to art museums through the Andy Warhol 181
Foundation for the Visual Arts, please see Little Red Book #178, 1974, Polaroid film, Frye Museum, Seattle; Red 
Book, 1974-75, Polaroid film, Guggenheim Museum, New York; Little Red Book #296, 1974-75, Polaroid film, 
Philbrook Museum of Art, Tulsa.
 Mao, “25. Unity” from Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972). 182
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literary creator, Warhol conveys his message through the use of photography, reflecting the 
power of Mao’s portrait while simultaneously parodying it with the variety of appearances from 
his social circle. A viewer could thus peruse a Little Red Book as they could the Quotations. In 




As Box-Mao and the Mao series have shown, Mao himself, and subsequently China’s 
image continuously shifted with the advent of the sixties and early seventies. The 
aforementioned examples of artistic reinterpretations of the Quotations reflect and defy the 
media-based understandings of Mao, Maoism, and subsequently China. Despite the fact that they 
were both prominent and educated media creators, Albee and Warhol were still civilians. They 
worked within the confines of what they could receive from American news coverage and thus 
were left with a slanted understanding of their source material. However, through the subtleties 
granted through artistic expression, Albee and Warhol were able to formulate unique perspectives 
on the Quotations that could be ruminated on by their (American) audience and allow viewers to 
formulate their unique opinions. Where Albee paradoxically demanded a “realistic” performance 
of Mao within his abstracted play that produced a skewed and provocative characterization, 
Warhol parodied the Chinese leader through the means of paint and capitalist-style mass 
reproduction. Both men utilized different aspects of the Quotations to recreate Mao, turning him 
from real-life figure to Americanized character. 
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Albee and Warhol were only two facets of a tumultuous American artistic culture forming 
in the 60s and 70s, borne of a mixture of biased foreign news coverage, civil unrest, and multiple 
frustrations within American society. The Quotations became both a template and a source on 
which these media creators impressed their thoughts and beliefs. Mao’s popular image helped to 
accentuate the Quotations’ popularity, as it became a “reliable” source of his own words. As was 
true among the scholars and writers elaborated on in the previous chapters, the development of 
the Quotations’ meaning within American culture correlated with Mao’s, and ultimately China’s, 



















 Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung was a critical element of cementing Mao’s 
power and spreading the chaotic fervor of the Cultural Revolution throughout China. Through 
the active translation and dissemination of Maoist ideology, the Quotations also played a 
significant role in shaping and reshaping the political and cultural landscape of the mid-century 
United States. The societal discontent among Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
stemming from a potent political mixture of domestic disagreements, international turmoil, and 
ongoing movements for social equality, provided a “perfect storm” of opportunity for the 
Quotations’ message to disseminate from China to the United States.  
 As a display of “soft power,” the Chinese Communist Party intended to court greater 
American sympathy through the Quotations, “advertising” it as a comprehensive introduction to 
Mao thought and thus an introduction to New China. Although they were successful in earning 
the loyalties of many members of the 1960s “radical left,” ultimately the CCP may not have 
accounted for possible usages of the “Little Red Book” beyond their original intentions. 
Americans, whether sympathetic to Maoism or not, used the book, its image, or its ideas to 
create, reinvent, and display their own thoughts and beliefs regarding Mao, China, the United 
States, or a combination of the three. This thesis discussed how the Quotations and its Maoist 
sympathies were transformed a vehicle of thought and innovation in three major venues: 
universities and academia, literary satire and parody, and the arts and culture.   
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 In academia, China studies scholars debated fervently over how to understand the 
Cultural Revolution through the lens of Maoism, which allowed them to push beyond Fairbank’s 
impact-response model and develop a more “China-centered” approach to China studies 
scholarship. For a brief time, they were split over this matter; older scholars struggled to connect 
New China with its imperial past, and younger scholars, displeased with the lofty objectivity of 
their elder peers, accepted much of China’s propaganda as truth and began incorporating Maoist 
rhetoric into their lives and careers, eventually forming such radically inclined organizations like 
the Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars, which were active in spreading pro-China and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric alongside their non-academic leftist peers. Writers of varying political 
inclinations were also inspired by the influx of Chinese materials into the U.S., and utilized the 
structure and language peculiar to the Quotations to parody or praise American political leaders 
and even religious figures, appropriating the Chinese text in their attempt to communicate their 
respective messages to audiences. Finally, artists, too, were inspired by the sociopolitical climate 
of the 1960s, and incorporated visual and textual understandings of the Quotations in their 
respective works that revealed both the depths of their beliefs regarding the state of American 
society as well as the limitations of their knowledge, owing to contemporary mainstream 







The Little Red Book Today 
 !  
 [Figure 1: The official Mao portrait with Donald Trump’s face edited onto it. Image 
courtesy of gzalenski, http://imgur.com/gallery/iWoviVC. Downloaded in April 2017.] 
It would now be beneficial to return to the present and consider, with this given 
knowledge, how the Quotations’ influence continues to be relevant in the American imagination. 
As of April 2017, the first few months of President Donald Trump’s presidency have been 
fraught with controversy, leading some observers to draw parallels between the Trump 
Administration and Mao’s regime. Artists have created images literally combining the two 
leaders’ recognizable faces, producing Warhol-style works like the portrait above where Trump 
and Mao, American capitalist and Chinese Communist, are one and the same. Some journalists 
have gone as far as to call Trump “America’s Mao Zedong” or the “true new Maoist,” and their 
accusations are generally based in Trump and Mao’s similarly populist and authoritarian natures. 
The comparisons are many — Elizabeth Lynch compared the Trump presidential campaign’s 
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ideological demands to that of Mao’s “harebrained ideas” (the Great Leap Forward), suggesting 
that both were irrational plans based on ideology rather than logic, equally doomed to fall.  183
Kerry Brown noted how Trump’s constant appeals to the general public mimicked Mao’s rousing 
of the peasantry in order to take down the societal elites.  Perhaps the most damning opinion of 184
the lot lies in Jiayang Fan’s observation, which focused on the charismatic yet divisive qualities 
of the two leaders that Americans considered unsettling, but modern Chinese saw as eerily 
familiar. She wrote: 
 
The us-versus-them dichotomy, a cornerstone of Maoism later enshrined in [Mao’s] Little 
Red Book, effectively painted the world in black and white, banishing diversity, 
difference, or considerations of civil liberty. Yet that worldview has found curious 
potency sixty-odd years later in the mouth of another bombastic demagogue, reared in a 
wholly different political system, who shares Mao’s knack for polemical excess and 
xenophobic paranoia.  185 
 Is this, then, the legacy of the Quotations and similar CCP literature in the United States? 
Certainly, it can be determined that the Quotations’ image, structure, and language has become a 
comedic political archetype in American popular culture, but its influence is more significant 
than simply as a parodic template. In the international realm, it helped to shape how American 
citizens, not simply powerful political leaders or experienced diplomats, understood China in the 
late 1960s and early 70s. Moreover, as this thesis has repeatedly proven, its influence extended 
far beyond the leftist radicals that the CCP intended for the Quotations to reach; liberals, 
 Elizabeth Lynch, “America’s Mao Zedong,” Foreign Policy, February 1, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/183
2017/02/01/americas-mao-zedong-trump-chaos-is-deliberate/. 
 Kerry Brown, “Trump: The True New Maoist,” The Diplomat, January 19, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/184
2017/01/trump-the-true-new-maoist/. 
 Jiayang Fan, “The Maoism of Donald Trump,” The New Yorker, May 13, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/185
news/daily-comment/the-maoism-of-donald-trump. 
 95
conservatives, and non-partisans alike digested its messages and reshaped them for their own 
purposes. The Quotations was not simply borrowed, but appropriated, or even completely torn 
apart and reshaped to suit the desires of Americans struggling to make sense of a rapidly 
changing world. It is my belief that this project has opened new pathways in understanding a 
window into where Americans caught a fleeting and sometimes misleading glimpse of what was, 
for decades, one of the most inscrutable and isolated countries in the world. This is a relatively 
new angle of discussion regarding shifting American views of China, and it will be illuminating 
to see how future studies could continue to elaborate on what I have already written here. I also 
believe that this may open up more inquiries as how media, both textual and visual, could have 
impacted the turbulent social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s while influencing 
intercultural dialogue between nations. 
 It is difficult to say whether the Quotations will continue to remain significant in modern 
China, more than a relic of its recent past. Within its native country, it has become a piece of 
Communist nostalgia, with rare undamaged copies occasionally commanded on the auction 
block; in the United States, it speaks to a brief and tumultuous time period in which the “global 
sixties” collided with Americans’ struggle to reshape their understanding of the foreign world. 
Although the Little Red Book’s short-lived popularity may gradually become a thing of the past, 
its significance will likely remain in the greater context of Chinese-American relations. The 
Quotations was one venue in which Americans connected with China; time will tell how further 
interactions between the two countries will continue to influence each other, whether on the 
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Appendix 1: Valtman, Edmund. “The New Religion.” The Hartford Times. October 13, 1966. 
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division. 
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Appendix 2: Actors Nancy Kelly and Wyman Pendleton (dressed as Mao) performing in the 
1968 run of Box and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung by Edward Albee.  
Photo still from Clive Barnes, “Theater: Albee's Adventurous Plays: 'Box' and 'Quotations of 




Appendix 3: Mao (1972), Andy Warhol. Silkscreen on canvas. 82 x 57 in.  
A massive portrait that displays some of the typical characteristics of other portraits within the 
prolific series — bright, unnatural colors and lipstick-like paint smeared onto the canvas. 














Appendix 4: Stereotype plate from first English language printing, Beijing 1966. https://














Appendix 5: Front cover of Quotations from Chairman LBJ  by Jack Shepherd and Christopher 
Wren.
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